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Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to
Law Practice
ELI WALD* AND RUSSELL G. PEARCE†

ABSTRACT
In response to past generations of debates regarding whether law is a business
or profession, we advance an alternative approach that rejects the dichotomies of
business and profession, or hired gun and wise counselor. Instead, we propose a
relational account of law practice. Unlike frameworks grounded in assumptions
of atomistic individualism or communitarianism, a relational perspective recognizes that all actors, whether individuals or organizations, have separate
identities yet are intrinsically inter-connected and cannot maximize their own
good in isolation. Through the lens of relational self-interest, maximizing the
good of the individual or business requires consideration of the good of the
neighbor, the employee or customer, and of the public. Accordingly, relational
lawyers advise and assist clients, colleagues, and themselves to take into account
the well-being of others when contemplating and pursuing their own interests.
A relational approach to law practice does not require a choice between
labeling law a business or a profession, and indeed is consistent with both
perspectives. Lawyers can access relational perspectives from a wide range of
understandings of the lawyer’s role, with the exception of the particular hired gun
ideology that views lawyers as amoral mouthpieces for clients who act as
Holmesian bad men and women aggressively pursuing their self-interest with no
regard to others. The relational framework offers all lawyers, whether they see
themselves as professionals or business persons, a framework for understanding
that they can continue to serve as society’s civic teachers in their capacity as
intermediaries between the people and the law, integrating relational self-interest
into their representation of clients and their community service. By doing so,
lawyers as professionals, individuals, and community members will more
effectively represent clients, as well as enhance their contribution to the public
good and to the quality of their own professional and private lives. They will also
surmount the generation-long malaise resulting from the crisis of professionalism.

* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
† Edward and Marilyn Bellet Chair in Legal Ethics, Religion and Morality, Fordham University School of
Law. We thank participants in the Being Ethical in the Profession and Changing the Profession to be Ethical,
symposium at Georgetown Law Center, for their helpful feedback. Our deepest appreciation to our outstanding
researchers Natasha Dasani and Rachard Kemp. © 2016, Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce.

601

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2840886

602

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 29:601

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

602

I. THE CRISIS OF PROFESSIONALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

606

A.

THE PROFESSIONALISM PARADIGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

606

B.

THE PARADIGM IN CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

608

II. BEING A GOOD LAWYER: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LAW
PRACTICE, PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY, ROLE MORALITY AND
CIVIC LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

612

A.

ATOMISM, THE CRISIS OF PROFESSIONALISM, AND THE
EMERGING RELATIONAL PARADIGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

612

B.

A RELATIONAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP . . . . .

616

C.

RELATIONAL PLAUSIBILITY: PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY
AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . .

626

D.

RELATIONALITY IN THE WORKPLACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

633

E.

RELATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

635

III. THE FALSE DICHOTOMIES OF PROFESSIONALISM CRISIS
DISCOURSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

637

A.

THE BUSINESS-PROFESSION DICHOTOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

638

B.

THE LAWYER’S ROLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

641

C.

JOB SATISFACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

644

D.

SEGMENTATION OR SHARED VALUES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

645

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

647

INTRODUCTION
The practice of law is great work. In a liberal democracy, the law shapes how
people live their personal lives and participate in business and in civil society. In
the United States, lawyers perform much, but not all, of law work.1 Yet, for more

1. See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 368,
378-81 (2014) [hereinafter Barton, Lawyer’s Monopoly]; John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
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than a generation, bar leaders and scholars have bemoaned the decline, betrayal,
or death of the legal profession.2 What explains this divergence between the great
work of law and these widespread negative perceptions? And how can we find a
way to restore the convergence between the greatness of law work and the way
lawyers and the public view that work? This article argues that a relational
perspective will help lawyers move beyond the crisis of professionalism and will
provide them with a framework for exploring practical ways to improve the
quality of their work, their satisfaction with their work, and their contribution to
their communities, and, as a result, more effectively serve clients, the legal
system and the public interest.
The need for a new paradigm today arises from the ineffectiveness of the
traditional lawyer professionalism paradigm, which historically provided the
dominant, although not universal, guide to the lawyer’s vocation.3 That historical
paradigm–the business-profession dichotomy–held that in contrast to business
people who sought to maximize profit, lawyers worked primarily for the public
good in their representation of clients and their civic leadership.4 Under this
paradigm, lawyers combined zealous representation with a responsibility to
counsel their clients on the spirit, as well as the letter of the law, and the public
good. And zealous representation did not permit lawyers to be uncivil or to
subvert the legal system.5
The traditional paradigm, however, has been in decline. The dominant
conception of the lawyer’s role had shifted from professionalism’s combination
of public and private responsibilities to the exclusively private role of extreme
partisan for the client with little moral or public accountability,6 a conception
consistent both with the traditional rhetoric of zealous representation as well as
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery
of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2000).
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See generally, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter Gordon, Independence]; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995)
[hereinafter Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift]; Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue
State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006)
[hereinafter Pearce, Blue State]; Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193
(2015) [hereinafter Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism].
4. See Anthony T. Kronman, Legal Ethics: Professionalism, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 89, 90–91 (1999);
Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1356.
5. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 117–20 (1884); Russell Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 261 (1992) [hereinafter
Pearce, Legal Ethics Codes]; see also, Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del.
1994) (“Staunch advocacy on behalf of a client is proper and fully consistent with the finest effectuation of skill
and professionalism. Indeed, it is a mark of professionalism, not weakness, for a lawyer zealously and firmly to
protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests by a professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward all
persons involved in the litigation process.”).
6. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xx (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE]; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 8 (1998) [hereinafter
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the profit maximizing ethic of business. This new hired gun ideology is grounded
in an atomistic conception that defines self-interest as the narrow, short term
interest of the atomistic actor—the Holmesian bad man’s normative goal of what
he can get away with7—and thereby defines any concern for others as
inconsistent with self-interest. This atomistic perspective became dominant after
the 1960s and helps explain the ascendance of extreme partisanship and the
decline of professionalism.8
The results of this paradigm shift for the legal profession have been profound:
surveys indicate that the public has lost respect for lawyers9 and that lawyers
exhibit lower levels of job satisfaction and higher levels of substance abuse and
anxiety related mental illness than the general public.10 Even the notion that legal
work shares a common core of responsibilities has come under challenge from
critics who argued that professional responsibilities were better promoted
through fragmented and specialized roles,11 or that professionalism was nothing
more than a self-serving myth.
During the past forty years, many lawyers and scholars have sought either to
revive belief in the business-profession dichotomy employing a wide range of
additional arguments to persuade lawyers to reimport public or moral responsibility into their role,12 rebuild the professionalism paradigm,13 or to offer
alternatives to the newly dominant conception of extreme partisanship.14 Others
have prescribed personal fulfillment as the way for lawyers to find meaning.15
While all of these efforts have made marginal progress, they have not succeeded
SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE]; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669, 672–74 (1978).
7. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458–60 (1897) (address
at the dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law on January 8, 1897).
8. See, e.g., Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1358–64.
9. See Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405,
1416–17 (1999). We recognize that the reputation of lawyers has often been mixed. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER,
LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005). Our point is that in recent years the reputation
has become more negative.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra notes 261–66 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSOC. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . In the Spirit of Public Service:” A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 10 (1986), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Commission_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKR8-GFY3] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2016) (“Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, professionalism for commercialism?”);
American Bar Association, A Guide to Professionalism Commissions 8 (2011); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN
MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Pearce, The
Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1241; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the
Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 1556 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, Law, Lawyers]; infra notes
224–35 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3.
14. See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
15. Cf., e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven
Prescription to Redefine Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 617-20 (2015); Susan Daicoff,
Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with
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in restoring commitment to the professionalism paradigm.16
In this article, we suggest that a way forward is emerging. Building on the
work of economists, philosophers, scientists, and legal scholars,17 we argue that
the atomistic understanding is descriptively false and normatively unpersuasive,
and is detrimental to both lawyers and their clients.18 In contrast, we apply and
develop a relational perspective that rejects the extreme individualism of the
atomistic conception and views individuals and organizations as both having
agency and existing within webs of relationships. Self-interest accordingly
requires consideration of the long-term impact of conduct on family, friends,
neighbors, and communities. Such a relational approach not only provides a
foundation for a fulfilling professional role for lawyers but also for a more
effective representation of clients.
Part I of this article describes the traditional paradigm of law practice and its
decline resulting in a crisis of professionalism. Part II first examines the rise of
the currently dominant atomistic conception and its corresponding ideology of
lawyers as hired guns, as well as its harmful consequences for lawyers and their
clients. It then introduces an alternative vision–a relational approach to law
practice–examining its potential benefits for lawyers and clients alike. Following
an interdisciplinary introduction of the core ideas of the relational framework,

Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
547, 566–71 (1998).
16. See Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 432 (2011)
(discussing the lack of commitment to teaching professionalism in law schools) [hereinafter Wald & Pearce,
Making Good Lawyers].
17. See, generally, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS:
A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES:
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); DONALD W. PFAFF & SANDRA SHERMAN, THE ALTRUISTIC
BRAIN: HOW WE ARE NATURALLY GOOD (2015); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM]; SIMON,
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6; Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1985);
ROBERT VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND
JUSTICE (2013); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); IRIS MARION YOUNG,
RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE (2011); Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden, Fraternity: Why the Market Need Not be a
Morally Free Zone, 24 ECON. & PHIL. 35 (2008); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998); Gordon, Independence, supra note 3; Bruce A. Green & Russell
G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009) [hereinafter Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher]; Katherine R. Kruse,
Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005) [hereinafter Kruse,
Lawyers, Justice]; Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism (UNC Legal Studies, Research Paper No.
2676094, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2676094 [https://perma.cc/C87Q-5CUT] (last visited Apr. 2, 2016);
Rhode, Law, Lawyers, supra note 12; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3; Thomas Shaffer, The
Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 986–87 (1987); Hilary Sommerlad, Women
Solicitors in a Fractured Profession: Intersections of Gender and Professionalism in England and Wales, 9
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 213 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469, 515–19
(1990); Benjamin Zipursky, The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics: Introduction, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1143 (2006).
18. See Wald & Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, supra note 16, at 407.
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Part II explores in detail the meaning of a relational approach to law
practice: how it can inform and shape the attorney-client relationship, serve as the
basis for alternative ideologies to the dominant hired-gun professional ideology,
help reimagine rules of professional conduct, improve the organization and
practice of law firms, and enhance legal education. Part III explores the impact of
a relational approach on the discourse of professionalism. It argues that four false
dichotomies have dominated the legal profession’s discourse during the crisis of
professionalism and demonstrates how all four dichotomies mistakenly rely in
whole or in part on the atomistic conception. Finally, Part III explains how a
relational perspective turns these false dichotomies into workable challenges.
Law can be both a business and a profession. Lawyers can disagree on the
specific contours of their role while retaining a core shared identity that, in turn,
can provide a source of meaning in work that promotes job satisfaction.

I. THE CRISIS OF PROFESSIONALISM
A. THE PROFESSIONALISM PARADIGM

As far-fetched as the argument may sound today, the belief in the businessprofession dichotomy provided the foundation for the elements of traditional
lawyer professionalism that were dominant, although not exclusive, from the
early days of the United States through the 1960s.19 Business people worked to
maximize profits through a regulated market.20 Professionals, in contrast,
possessed inaccessible expertise and primarily pursued the public good, not
self-interest, entitling them to autonomy as individuals and as a group.21 Under
the business-profession dichotomy, lawyers were zealous representatives of
clients who served the public good through wise counsel and civic leadership.22
The business-profession dichotomy was essential to traditional professionalism’s understanding that lawyers played a vital role in a liberal democracy.
Federalist No. 35 explained that an elite leadership class was necessary to help
guide the will of the majority in order to promote and protect the rule of law and
the public good.23 Although the framers identified professionals generally as the

19. Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1346–51, 1358–59.
20. See, e.g., Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1231.
21. See id.
22. See Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the
Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 26 (2011) [hereinafter Pearce &
Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal].
23. The Federalist No. 35, at 214-16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter The
Federalist No. 35]; see also Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381,
385–87 (2001) [hereinafter Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role]; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note
3, at 203, 206.
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elite leadership class,24 lawyers and the rest of the American elite soon came to
identify lawyers in particular as the group responsible for civic leadership. In
1835, when Alexis de Tocqueville met with American leaders in an effort to
ascertain how America could enjoy majority rule without majority tyranny, he
described lawyers as the “highest political class.”25
Although significant voices both within and outside the profession questioned
the business-profession dichotomy, it retained its hold on the leadership of the
legal profession until the mid-twentieth century.26 During the Jacksonian era
when legislatures eroded the barriers to becoming a lawyer, David Hoffman and
George Sharswood authored guides for legal ethics grounded in a republican
understanding of lawyers’ leadership role.27 In a related move to protect the
business-profession dichotomy, when both lawyers and non-lawyers worried in
the late nineteenth century that law practice had become a business, elite lawyers
formed the American Bar Association (ABA) partly in order to promote and
protect the traditional vision of professionalism.28
Under traditional lawyer professionalism, lawyers could balance client advocacy with the public good if they served as civics teachers who explained to
clients the importance of the spirit, as well as the letter, of the law, and the public
good.29 In the nineteenth century, Judge George Sharswood, whose work became
the basis for the ABA Canons of Ethics, popularized the use of the term “zealous
advocacy” for purposes of describing client representation at the same time as he
instructed ethical lawyers to serve as civics teachers and to reject Lord Henry
Brougham’s claim30 that lawyers should serve as hired guns for their clients.31 As
recently as the early 1960s, Erwin Smigel’s survey of Wall Street lawyers

24. The Federalist No. 35, supra note 23, at 214-16.
25. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 304 (Henry Reeve trans., Edward Walker 1847)
(1835), https://books.google.com/books?id⫽sRETAAAAYAAJ&pg⫽PA304&dq⫽%22democracy⫹in⫹
america%22⫹%22Highest⫹political⫹class%22&hl⫽en&sa⫽X&ved⫽0ahUKEwiUq9-qnLLMAhUqkIMKHT
2sBrQQ6AEIIzAB#v⫽onepage&q⫽%22democracy%20in%20america%22%20%22Highest%20political%20
class%22&f⫽false [https://perma.cc/VU7L-RSXJ] (last visited June 17, 2016).
26. See Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1361.
27. Id. at 1350.
28. See Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelman, Religious Lawyering In A Liberal Democracy: A Challenge
And An Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. 127, 147 (2004); see also John A. Matzko, “The Best Men of the Bar”: The
Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (describing the American Bar Association’s elite founders); Norman W.
Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2019–20 (2005).
29. See Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher, supra note 17, at 1212; Pearce & Wald, The Obligation
of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22, at 5.
30. Lord Brougham famously enunciated the notion that the lawyer should be an extreme partisan with no
moral accountability in the nineteenth century—the lawyer “knows . . . but one person in the world” and that is
the client. Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role, supra note 23, at 394. At that time, and through the 1960s, the
American elite expressly rejected Brougham’s view. Id. at 394–95. By the late twentieth century, prominent
commentators described Brougham’s dictum as the “basic narrative” of the legal profession, even mistakenly
reading that narrative retroactively into the profession’s history. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of
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similarly found that they understood themselves as guardians of the law who
served as civics teachers for their clients at the same time that they provided
zealous representation.32
In their everyday work, lawyers explained to clients, whether businesses or
individuals, their obligations to the letter and spirit of the law, as well as the
public good.33 As experts in the law, they provided guidance to their neighbors
and their communities, and often served in positions of public leadership, such as
in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government.34 Indeed,
private practice and public service were complimentary, such that private practice
was thought to be a form of public service, as well as a stepping stone to public
office, which in turn was not understood to be an end in itself but rather part of
career that combined both public and private duties.35 The practice of law in the
public and private sphere was consistent and self-enhancing.
Accordingly, traditional lawyer professionalism grounded in the businessprofession dichotomy provided the dominant, although not exclusive, framework
for understanding lawyers through the 1960s.36 For those who embraced
professionalism, it provided a powerful and inspirational guide for lawyers’
public and private roles.
B. THE PARADIGM IN CRISIS

The crisis of lawyer professionalism represented the manifestation in law of a
societal rejection of the potential for the public good. In the 1960s, both the left
and the right discredited the possibility of disinterested expertise. They asserted
that the public good did not exist. All was self-interest; pretentions to the public
good only masked financial and political self-interest.37 The concept of the bad
man that Oliver Wendell Holmes proposed as a metaphor for how to understand
the law38 had now become the dominant way to understand the motivation of
individuals and organizations.
Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991); Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319 (2006).
31. Pearce, Legal Ethics Codes, supra note 5, at 243–44, 248; Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher,
supra note 17, at 1227–28.
32. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 8–10 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555 (1905) (representing
businesses like diplomacy).
34. See id. at 556–57; Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role, supra note 23, at 387.
35. Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role, supra note 23, at 385–87; see also Gordon, Independence, supra note
3, at 14.
36. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 149 (Robert L.
Nelson et al., eds, 1992); Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1342; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra
note 3, at 207.
37. See, e.g., Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1358–64; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3;
Louis Menand, The Thrashing of Professionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 1995, at 41.
38. See Holmes, supra note 7, at 459.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reflected this shift in its 1977 decision in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona where it described “the belief that lawyers are somehow
‘above’ trade [as] an anachronism.”39 Indeed, law practice had always provided a
livelihood as well as a calling. In promoting professionalism, Roscoe Pound had
described law work as primarily “[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a
public service . . . . Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or
trade it is the entire purpose.”40 When the belief in public service was no longer
viable, gaining a livelihood became the entire purpose of law, exactly the same as
for other businesses.
Indicative of the crisis of professionalism, Chief Justice Burger delivered his
famous 1984 speech to the American Bar Association lamenting that lawyers had
abandoned the public good for profit and that professionalism was in crisis.41
Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman, Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann
Glendon, and law firm partner and statesman Sol Linowitz, joined with other
leaders of the profession in declaring “lawyers, their ethics, and their professionalism are ‘lost,’ ‘betrayed,’ in ‘decline,’ in ‘crisis,’ facing ‘demise,’ near ‘death,’
and in need of ‘redemption.’”42 As one state bar President observed, “the legal
profession is ‘on the way into a black hole of pure commercialism from which
there is no return[.]’”43 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia noted
that “‘something is wrong, and I think I know what it is. It is commercialism. Yes,
Commercialism, with a capital ‘C,’ and it has invaded the legal profession like a
swarm of locusts.’”44
As a result of the perceived commercialization, lawyers came to be viewed as
profit maximizers—and not just any profit maximizers, but Holmesian bad men
and women who pursued on behalf of clients whatever they could get away with
regardless of the consequences to others or to the community.45 Freed to
advertise by the Bates decision, lawyers’ marketing of their services became

39. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371–72 (1977).
40. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
41. See Warren E. Burger, C.J., The State of Justice: Remarks at the Mid-year Meeting of the American Bar
Association (Feb. 13-14, 1984), in A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 63.
42. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1257 (internal citations omitted); see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN SOCIETY 84 (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 243 (1993) [hereinafter KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER]; LINOWITZ & MAYER, supra note 12.
43. See Alex S. Keller, Professionalism: Where Has it Gone?, 14 COLO. LAW. 1383, 1385 (1985); see also
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1257.
44. Harry L. Carrico, The New Professionalism, N.Y.S. B.J., Jan. 1990, at 11, 12 (address delivered to first
class in Virginia State Bar’s mandatory course on professionalism); see also Pearce, The Professionalism
Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1257. But see Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 283, 283 (1998) (“Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears from
the chronic laments by critics within and outside the bar.”). For a discussion of the cycles of declination rhetoric
and bar responses, see, e.g., Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role, supra note 23.
45. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation:
The Exaggerated Death of BigLaw, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 130 (2013) [hereinafter Pearce & Wald, Relational
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transparent and they looked like other businesses in the marketplace.46 Of course,
even this view reflected a change in societal perception—David Hoffman and
Abraham Lincoln had advertised without appearing to be less committed to
lawyers’ public responsibilities.47 But advertising was not the only apparent
manifestation of business behavior. Law itself became a “big business” with tens
of billions of dollars in revenue.48 The compensation of law firm partners
exceeded a million dollars in the 1990s49 and the starting salary of associates rose
from “$10,000” in the 1960s to “$80,000 in the 1990s”50 and to $180,000 in
2016.51
A prominent manifestation of profit maximization was the perception that
pursuit of profit had caused lawyers to betray the “public trust”52 in order to serve
business clients without concern for either the spirit of the law or the public
good.53 As one of us noted in 1995:
While a professional “holds a position of independence, between the wealthy
and the people, prepared to curb the excess of either,” the Business Servant, in
contrast, seeks “to extract the maximum advantage of the legal system” for the
interests of wealth. In so doing, the Business Servant “skew[s legal outcomes]
in favor of resourceful parties, thus undermining the legitimacy of legal
institutions.” The Business Servant fails the professional duty to serve as a
“buffer between the illegitimate desires of clients and the social interest.”54

Infrastructure]; G. Edward White, Holmes’s “Life Plan”: Confronting Ambition, Passion, and Powerlessness,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1409, 1477 (1990).
46. See Carroll Seron, New Strategies for Getting Clients: Urban and Suburban Lawyers’ Views, 27 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 399, 400 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Robert F. Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective,
65 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1982) (discussing Abraham Lincoln); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why
Lawyers Should be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Service, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1084 n.2
(1983).
48. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 313 n.1 (1985).
49. “It is common for the top partners in the biggest firms to earn upwards of $2 million per year.” Patrick J.
Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession,
52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 900 (1999).
50. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1251 (citing Today’s News: Update,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 1 (identifying $83,000 as going rate for first-year associates at the major law firms in
New York City since 1989)).
51. Salaries for first-year associates at BigLaw firms remained stable at $160,000 from 2007 through 2016.
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP announced in June 2016 that it would raise first-year associate salaries to
$180,000 starting July 1, 2016 and other BigLaw firms soon followed. Elizabeth Olson, With Pay Jumps at Elite
Firm, Junior Lawyers Share Spoils, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), at B3; see also Brian Baxter, More Firms Jump
on Cravath Pay Scale, as S&C Beats Top End, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (June 9, 2016), http://
www.americanlawyer.com/id⫽1202759700996/ [https://perma.cc/9EAK-H6FK].
52. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1242–43.
53. Compare SMIGEL, supra note 32, at 8–10 with Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, 1358–65 (discussing
sources).
54. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1243–44 (internal citations omitted).

2016]

A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LAW PRACTICE

611

Accompanying the Business Servant account was a similar narrative painting
business clients as Holmesian bad men who had increased their power vis-à-vis
their lawyers so that even if big firm lawyers wanted to remain guardians of the
law they could no longer do so.55 According to the narrative, as business clients
became more atomistic, they no longer valued long term relationships with their
lawyers and instead demanded that lawyers compete with price and service for
their work.56 Further undermining the independence of outside law firms was the
increasing sophistication of in-house corporate departments that led them to
replace deference to outside lawyers with corporate control of outside
representation.57
As lawyers came to understand themselves as profit maximizers and business
servants, the image of lawyers as self-interested promoters of selfish interests
came to dominate public discourse. Many commentators outside the profession
complained that lawyers undermined the public interest as they manipulated the
legal system for their own advantage and that of their clients.58 Where lawyers
were once viewed as good faith intermediaries between the law and their clients,
they were now seen as selfishly promoting their own interests or those of their
clients without any regard for the public good.59 Public discourse labeled lawyers
as enemies of common sense and justice,60 or as rent-seekers who promote an
unnecessarily complex and wasteful legal system in order to enrich themselves.61
Predictably, the public came to view lawyers as “greedy”62 and believe that
“lawyers use the system to protect the powerful and enrich themselves.”63
Most alarmingly, the demise of the business-profession dichotomy and with it
the ability to understand their role as one meaningfully connected to the public
good has left lawyers who do not embrace a libertarian view that the public good
consists of extreme partisan lawyers representing self-interested clients64 without

55. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010); see also RAKESH KHURANA,
FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007).
56. See Ribstein, supra note 55; David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010) [hereinafter Wilkins, Team of Rivals?].
57. See Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407 (2012).
58. See Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1260–61.
59. See id. at 1251.
60. See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND BROKEN
GOVERNMENT (2015); WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS
AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW (2002).
61. See Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from Accounting Firms May Help
Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20 PACE L. REV. 43, 55–56 (1999).
62. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60,
62.
63. Stephen Budiansky & Ted Gest, How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995,
at 50, 51.
64. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (describing the
libertarian perspective).
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a meaningful sense of purpose in the practice of law. Not surprisingly,65 as a
result, their job satisfaction is below that of other occupations and their rates of
substance abuse and anxiety-rated mental illness are far higher.66 Some lawyers
report that they would advise their friends and relatives not to become lawyers.67
It should be noted, however, that other lawyers do buy into the belief that by
serving private clients they are serving the public interest exactly because the
public interest is nothing more than an aggregate of the clients’ private interests.68
Yet even such lawyers experience some professional discomfort in the increasingly transparent and competitive market for legal services.69

II. BEING A GOOD LAWYER: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LAW PRACTICE,
PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY, ROLE MORALITY AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP
A relational approach grounds lawyers’ practice, professional ideology, role
morality, civic leadership, and rules of professional conduct in a revived
understanding of the structural-functionalist view.70 That view, like professionalism, describes lawyers as intermediaries between the people and the law. But the
relational approach to self-interest does not rely on the business-profession
binary and therefore can offer lawyers a structural-functionalist way to find value
in their work consistent with familiar ways of understanding contemporary legal
culture.71
A. ATOMISM, THE CRISIS OF PROFESSIONALISM, AND THE EMERGING
RELATIONAL PARADIGM

The hired gun notion of the lawyer’s role relied upon a more general atomistic
conception72 that became dominant in law, business, and politics following the
1960s.73 Viewing individuals and organizations as having separate and unconnected existence, the atomistic perspective defined self-interest from the Holmesian bad man’s perspective—what an individual or organization could get away
with regardless of the impact on colleagues, customers, neighbors, or community.

65. See infra Part III.C.; see also Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15, at 621–23 (describing an empirical study
that demonstrates the importance of lawyers’ internal values to their job satisfaction).
66. See infra Part III.C.
67. See infra Part III.C.
68. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 20–21 (1998); Wald & Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, supra note 16, at 405.
69. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22, at 34; Eli Wald, Glass
Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes and the Future of Women Lawyers at
Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2245 (2010) (describing the dominant BigLaw ideology as
“hyper-competitive”).
70. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 37 (1989).
71. See Remus, supra note 17; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3, at 240.
72. Cf. Taylor, supra note 17.
73. Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22, at 17.
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Rakesh Khurana, for example, has traced how the atomistic perspective
transformed business behavior from long-term profits consistent with civic
leadership to short term profit maximization.74 In politics, conflicts became zero
sum and incivility became common.75
In law, the ascendance of atomism triggered the crisis of professionalism. The
structural-functionalist claim to disinterested leadership became unpersuasive.
Lawyers and their clients, whether individuals or businesses, were Holmesian
bad men who were not capable of perceiving or pursuing the public good. As
described above, the business-profession dichotomy, once a source of pride,
became the cause of crisis. The lawyer’s role evolved from zealous representative
consistent with the public good to extreme partisan, which many critics expressly
identified with the atomism of the Holmesian bad man.76 As a result, atomism
undermined the ability of many lawyers to find meaning in their work, and
promoted the perception that law work was specialized and fragmented, resulting
in the dichotomy between segmentation and universalism.
Unconstrained atomistic self-interest achieved cultural dominance.77 To the
extent that law is the social glue of our legalized culture, law has come to
celebrate and embody aggressive self-interest as morally desirable. Law not only
reflects our culture’s love affair with unconstrained self-interest, it also helps
construct it, legitimate it and further cement it as our normative core. It is
therefore within the power of law and lawyers to take a leadership role in
challenging the supremacy of atomistic self-interest.78 Indeed, a change in
culture is inevitably intertwined with a change in law. Law work will certainly
not be able to fashion a counter attack on unconstrained self-interest all by itself,
but it can and should play a role in the effort. In this sense, lawyers are
particularly well-situated for the role of challenging atomistic self-interest as a
legitimate and sufficient basis for business, politics, and law.
Yet if lawyers are to play a leading role in reintegrating a richer conception of
relational self-interest into law, economics, politics, and other areas of our
culture, then lawyers must first reconsider their unwarranted faith in atomistic
self-interest. Lawyers’ professional ideology, role morality and even rules of
professional conduct must be expanded from a narrow conception of clientcentered representation which relies on clients’ atomistic self-interest to a
conception that takes seriously other values, and, in particular, relational

74. See KHURANA, supra note 55.
75. See Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22. As we explain elsewhere,
incivility has always been present in politics and law practice. Yet it has increasingly become part of the norm,
as opposed to an exception to it.
76. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 17; VISCHER, supra note 17.
77. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22, at 415–18.
78. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, Relational Infrastructure, supra note 45, at 116.
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self-interest.79 These are explored below, but first a definition of a relational
approach to law practice is warranted.
As atomism gained traction after the 1960s, it soon faced challenges from
relational and communitarian perspectives. The communitarian view is the
opposite of the atomistic. Where the atomistic views all actions as grounded in
individual self-interest, “communitarianism claims that individual identity is
constituted or constructed by community.”80 The perspective between the
extremes of atomism and communitarianism81 is the relational approach that
rejects these binaries in favor of recognizing that individual and organizational
actors have both individual agency and exist through webs of relationships. As
Jennifer Nedelsky explains, “human beings have the capacity to interact
creatively with all the relationships that shape us—and thus to reshape, re-create,
both the relationships and ourselves.”82 This relational framework has become
prominent among philosophers, political theorists, neuroscientists, psychologists, feminist theorists, economists, and legal scholars.83
The relational perspective, in turn, provides a relational understanding of
self-interest distinct from the atomistic approach. Nobel Prize winner Amartya
Sen has challenged the framework of atomistic self-interest on both descriptive
and normative grounds. He explains that ethics is essential to the study of

79. Because the problem of unconstrained self-interest is a problem of culture, not a problem of lawyers and
the legal profession alone, other professionals as well as lay people have a role to play in combating it. For
example, in May of 2009 a group of Harvard Business School students introduced an MBA oath that redefined
self-interest to reintegrate the public good. See generally MAX ANDERSON & PETER ESCHER, THE MBA OATH:
SETTING A HIGHER STANDARD FOR BUSINESS LEADERS (2010). While the oath has been gaining in popularity one
might doubt the binding power of such a measure. Lawyers have long articulated lofty proclamations of
professional duties with questionable impact on their actual practices.
80. Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private, and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 474 (1997).
81. We recognize that the term communitarian is not always used consistently and that some commentators
employ it to refer to any political perspective which contrasts with pure individualism. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 7 (1996).
82. NEDELSKY, supra note 17, at 47.
83. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION TRIUMPHS OVER
SELF-INTEREST 2-7 (2011); PETER BUIRSKI & PAMELA HAGLUND, MAKING SENSE TOGETHER—THE INTERSUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO PSYCHOTHERAPY (2009); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); VIRGINIA HELD,
ETHICS OF CARE: PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL 63-64 (2006); CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH:
HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN,
EQUALITY AND DEPENDENCY 20 (1998); ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND VS FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1991); NEDELSKY, supra note 17; NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMINIST
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); NUSSBAUM, supra note 17; PFAFF & SHERMAN, supra note
17; AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note 17; Taylor, supra note
17; MICHAEL TOMASELLO, WHY WE COOPERATE 4 (2009); Young, supra note 17; Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17;
Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 263 (2006); Timothy D. Lytton, Rules and Relationships: The Varieties of Wrongdoing in Tort
Law, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 359 (1997); Eduardo M. Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889
(2005); Daniel Siegel & Debra Pearce McCall, Mindsight at Work: An Interpersonal Neurobiology Lens on
Leadership, NEUROLEADERSHIP J., 2009, at 1.
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economics. Rejecting the notion that people are fundamentally maximizers of
their own self-interest, he argues that “many distinct ethical considerations”
influence behavior, such as “bonhomie and sympathy for others” and “commitments to various causes.”84 He observes that “[t]he jettisoning of all motivations
and valuations other than the extremely narrow one of self-interest is hard to
justify on grounds of predictive usefulness, and it also seems to have rather
dubious empirical support.”85
Economists Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden similarly reject atomistic
self-interest on both descriptive and normative grounds. They note, for example,
that atomism cannot explain why people often observe unenforceable agreements
or refrain from enforcing the letter of contracts.86 They explain that economic
exchanges are more generally characterized by an ethic of mutual benefit that
combines both self-interest and reciprocal concern for others.87 Rejecting the
notion that economic exchanges are morality-free, they argue that mutual benefit
is both morally mandated and necessary to long-term self-interest. Economic
development—the creation of economic value—requires that parties trust that
their counter-parties will respond with mutual benefit, and will not try to take
advantage of them.88 The latter strategy discourages the creation of value by
dissuading people from entering economic exchanges.
Bruni and Sugden’s work is especially relevant to lawyers.89 In describing
economic exchanges as a social relationship, they reject binaries between
economic and social, self-regarding and self-sacrificing.90 Applying this analysis
to the economics of caring occupations, which would presumably include the
work of the lawyer, Bruni and Sugden accordingly reject theories that workers in
these occupations are motivated by “intrinsic motivations” that are “incompatible
with market motivations,” such as the business-profession dichotomy.91 Instead,
they argue that the economics of caring occupations are characterized by an ethic
of mutual benefit that combines self-regarding and self-sacrificing elements just
like other economic exchanges.92

84. SEN, supra note 83, at 89.
85. Id. at 79.
86. See Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 41; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 57 (1963) (studying relational approaches in commercial
law).
87. They do not use the specific terms atomistic self-interest and relational self-interest, but their analysis
applies to these concepts. See Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 41; see also DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE
SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US (2009).
88. See Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 46–47.
89. See, e.g., Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, What’s Love Got to Do with Lawyers? Thoughts on Relationality,
Love, and Lawyers’ Work, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 334 (2014).
90. See id. at 343.
91. See Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 58.
92. Id. at 51.
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Relational self-interest assumes that people and organizations exist in relationships—they are not atomistic.93 From this perspective, mutual benefit is
necessary to self-interest. Because people are all inter-connected, one’s actions
that affect a colleague, client, adversary, neighbor, or community will eventually
have some direct or indirect impact on someone else in the organization. As Bruni
and Sugden explain, this exchange is mutually beneficial both on a micro level
that benefits the participants and on a macro level that benefits society.94
Relational self-interest mandates an ethic of mutual benefit in relationships that
includes basic values, such as honesty, trust and cooperation, as well as
consideration of the public good.
To be clear, relational self-interest is consistent with all but the Holmesian bad
man conception of the lawyer’s role as extreme partisan. A range of responsible
partisan perspectives that leave room for mutually beneficial dialogue all fall
within the relational spectrum.
B. A RELATIONAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP95

A relational approach applies to all facets of law practice and to all actors with
whom a lawyer interacts. To begin with, the attorney-client relationship is a
social interaction; clients are not means to lawyers’ ends—paying the bills,
working on challenging cases, attaining status and power—but rather partners in
a mutual exchange. The goal of the relationship from the lawyer’s perspective is
both to earn a livelihood and to educate and assist clients in the pursuit of their
goals on an informed basis.96 Empowering clients in a relational manner requires
getting to know them and their objectives. A relational approach does not
necessarily entail becoming friends with one’s clients,97 but it does require
treating the client as party to a relationship by getting to know a client well
enough to understand decisions in context. Thus, a relational approach is
inconsistent with both imputing generic goals to clients and with accepting a

93. Cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981); Naomi R. Cahn,
Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (1985).
94. See Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17.
95. While a “relational relationship” sounds redundant we nonetheless use it because the “attorney-client
relationship” is a term of art, and as importantly, because the relationship has become very much a reflection of
the standard conception, that is, an atomistic, individualized relationship in which both attorney and client
aggressively pursue their own self-interest and in which the attorney assists the client to pursue narrow
self-interest. In this context, a “relational relationship” is anything but redundant. Eventually, of course, if our
suggestions are accepted, the definition of the attorney-client relationship will be that of a relational
relationship.
96. See Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L.
REV. 747 (2008).
97. Cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
44–45 (1994) [hereinafter SHAFFER & COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS]; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060, 1073–74 (1976).
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client’s stated goals “as-is” without developing an informed perspective from
which a lawyer can understand them.98
For example, a matrimonial attorney representing a party in a dissolution of
marriage should not assume that the client’s objective is to aggressively pursue
the client’s own narrow self-interest leaving their soon to be ex-spouse with as
little as possible and should not accept this to be the client’s goal without more.99
Instead, the attorney must learn more about the client’s relationship with the
significant other as well as with other related parties if any, his values and
feelings, as well as stated and unstated objectives, to allow the lawyer to develop
a perspective from which she can understand the client’s interests and objectives
and from which she can offer informed advice. Relational advice will in turn
reflect the client’s short and long term interests, and an assessment of the
proposed course of conduct on affected parties.
Similarly, a corporate attorney retained by an entity client to help it reorganize
or merge with another entity should not assume that the corporate client’s sole
objective is to maximize short-term profits. As former in-house counsel Ben
Heineman, large law firm leader William Lee, and prominent scholar David
Wilkins explain,
the ultimate goal of corporations—especially global companies—should be the
fusion of high performance with high integrity, with the general counsel and
inside lawyers playing key roles in achieving both. High performance means
strong sustained economic growth through provision of superior goods and
services, which in turn provide durable benefits for shareholders and other
stakeholders upon whom the company’s health depends. Such commercial
performance entails an essential balance between risk-taking and economic risk
management.100

Rather, treating the client as a relational organization, the lawyer should
inquire about the entity’s relationships with its employees, customers, and
creditors and the impact of the proposed course of conduct, if any, on
communities in which the entity operates.101 As a result, the lawyer’s advice

98. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Lawyers, Loyalty and Social Change, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 941, 963–68 (2013);
Gordon, Independence, supra note 3, at 3, 5; William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 222–24 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, Lawyer Advice]: (describing the
autonomy and paternalistic approaches to counseling).
99. Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The Challenges of Divorce
Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 63, 75–76, 84 (Leslie C. Levin &
Lynn Mather eds., 2012) [hereinafter LAWYERS IN PRACTICE]; Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional
Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 267–69 (2014) [hereinafter Wald, Resizing].
100. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. et al., Lawyers as Professionals and as Citizens: Key Roles and Responsibilities
in the 21st Century, HARV. L. SCH. CENTER ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Nov. 20, 2014), https://clp.law.harvard.
edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-Essay_11.20.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR6J-MT3W].
101. The theory of “stakeholder” interests in a corporation is not new to corporate law. In Revlon, Inc. v.
Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that, in
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should reflect not only commitment to maximizing value to shareholders but also
a consideration of other stakeholders likely to be effected by the organization’s
conduct. As Heineman, Lee and Wilkins observe, “Ultimately, high performance
with high integrity creates fundamental trust among shareholders, creditors,
employees, recruits, customers, suppliers, regulators, communities, the media,
and the general public.”102 Echoing Bruni and Sugden, they note that “[t]his trust
is essential to sustaining the corporate power and freedom that drives the
economy.”103 They acknowledge that as a practical matter the relational approach
will require “rebalancing” atomistic legal and corporate culture “and will require
commitment to long-term goals and values, even at the expense of short-term
economics.”104
The content of relational advice may vary greatly among different lawyers.
Should the matrimonial attorney advise her client to be reasonably generous
toward his soon to be ex-wife? How generous? And should the client consider not
only his own and his children’s best interests but also the feelings of his wife’s
parents in designing custody arrangements, let alone the interests and feelings of
his wife? Similarly, what stakeholders should be considered by the entity client in
its reorganization plan? And what consideration specifically should these
constituents receive? Different lawyers with different values may answer these
questions differently. As alarming as this proposition may sound to some lawyers,
such pluralism is a desirable aspect of a relational approach to law practice.
The currently dominant approach to lawyers’ role morality leaves little room
for values other than atomistic self-interest. The American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) formally permit broad discretion
to lawyers,105 noting that lawyers have discretion to advise clients on relevant
moral considerations and similarly may exercise “moral judgment”106 and

the context of a hostile tender offer, a board of directors might be warranted in considering the interests of note
holders in addition to those of stockholders. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and
Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1983, at 88, 89
(“[Stakeholder theory] says that there are other groups to whom the corporation is responsible in addition to
stockholders: those groups who have a stake in the actions of the corporation.”); see also Ann E. Conaway,
Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might
Inform, Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792–93 (2008); Mario Minoja,
Stakeholder Management Theory, Firm Strategy, and Ambidexterity, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 67, 68 (2012); Eric W.
Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 606–08 (2009).
102. Heineman et al., supra note 100, at 22.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Pearce, Legal Ethics Codes, supra note 5, at 242; Bruce Green, The Role of Professional Values in
Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 42 (1997).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RULE 2.1; Id. at pmbl. para. 9 (2015) (“In the nature of law practice,
however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict
between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining
an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms
for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional
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consult their “personal conscience.”107 Yet these moral “escape hatches” mean
little when lawyers, like others within our culture, adopt a reductive marketbased atomistic morality because then resorting to one’s personal conscience and
moral judgment only confirms the supremacy of narrow self-interest. Expanding
the breadth and scope of lawyers’ approach has been constrained by law’s desire
to insulate itself from other values.108
Contrary to the reductive position of the atomistic perspective, we must make
room for values other than narrow self-interest to enter and inform the relational
foundation of the practice of law and its rules of conduct. These values will
reflect our pluralist commitments and our multi-faceted identities. We must
self-consciously expand the foundation of the practice of law to explicitly
incorporate these very diverse values. There is no doubt that opening the door to,
and acknowledging the legitimacy of other non-legal considerations in lawyers’
legitimate exercise of professional judgment represents a challenge and a danger
to law’s legitimacy. But the profession cannot escape this challenge because the
alternatives are unappealing: the current self-interested culture has proven again
and again how reductively dangerous it is, and formulations that call for fidelity
to the law or to justice,109 as compelling as they are in theory, are likely to fail
because they run against a reductive market-based atomistic ideology defining
our values universe in terms of unconstrained self-interest.110
Lawyers must acknowledge, and, in turn, explain to others that it is legitimate
and desirable to turn to relational values in defining their role morality and
exercising their professional judgment. The road to challenging the dominance of
unconstrained self-interest goes through acknowledging the relevance and
importance of the identities we maintain as individuals rooted in webs of
relationships. The road to reversing the divorce of relational accountability from
business conduct, legal culture, and political discourse entails developing

discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer’s obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.”) (emphasis added).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7 (2015) (“Many of a lawyer’s professional
responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer
should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the
legal profession’s ideals of public service.”) (emphasis added).
108. The Model Rules, for example, still call upon lawyers to attempt and resolve “difficult” questions and
conflicts between lawyers’ competing roles in terms of the “principles underlying the Rules” without explicitly
defining or even identifying these principles. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, para. 9. Embracing such
principles and other values, however, is exactly the task at hand.
109. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007) [hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS];
SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6; WENDEL, supra note 17.
110. See Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Beyond Cardboard Lawyers in Legal Ethics, 15 LEGAL ETHICS 147
(2012) (reviewing W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010)) [hereinafter Wald & Pearce,
Beyond Cardboard Lawyers].
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strategies for lawyers to lead themselves, their clients and ultimately our nation
toward a return to moral accountability.
Accordingly, we ought to accept as desirable that different matrimonial and
corporate lawyers, informed by diverse values, should offer their respective
clients different advice about how exactly to take into account the interests of
others likely to be impacted by the client’s course of conduct. Indeed, it is in this
pluralist sense that a relational approach to law practice does not demand of
lawyers Herculean efforts in the practice of law.111 Advising clients in complex
situations may not be an easy task, yet it is an undertaking in which different
lawyers will be guided by their diverse values and core beliefs. Clients,
empowered by relational advice, will in turn be in a position to set the objectives
of the attorney-client relationship on an informed basis. And, to be clear, clients
from a relational perspective have ultimate authority in the attorney-client
relationship.112
Lawyers interested in adopting a relational approach, however, might reasonably wonder about client reactions to it in a competitive market for legal services
dominated by atomism. To begin with, what is a relational attorney to do if her
client insists on pursuing a “bad person” course of conduct, with little regard to
the interests of others, the lawyer’s advice notwithstanding?113 To begin with, the
question misses an important aspect of a relational approach. In a relational
context, one in which lawyer and client treat each other as parties to a social
relationship, many clients are unlikely to totally disregard the lawyer’s advice.
This is, to be sure, not because of some blind deference clients owe lawyers,114
but because the lawyer’s advice in a relational context would be informed by an
appreciation and an understanding of the client’s values and interests. Why would
clients wish to systematically disregard advice they know to be grounded in their
own values and interests? Put differently, the question assumes the very atomism
this article challenges. It assumes that clients would choose to ignore their
lawyers’ advice and revert back to their atomistic self-interested perspective. Yet,
while such an assumption may be a plausible one under the dominant standard
conception, it is simply not an inevitable one in a relational paradigm.
However, exactly because of our commitment to value pluralism, reasonable
clients and lawyers may on occasion disagree.115 Would a relational attorney
paternalistically insist that the client adopt her advice when lawyer and client
disagree? Of course not. The primary difference between the relational and

111. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 241–55 (1986).
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2015).
113. Cf. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics
of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1556–58, 1565–71(1995).
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2015).
115. See WENDEL, supra note 17; Katherine Kruse, Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Legitimacy (June 25,
2015) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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atomistic attorney is that the relational lawyer seeks dialogue regarding the
client’s goals, in contrast to atomistic approaches where the client provides
instructions without dialogue or without full dialogue regarding the relational
implications of a decision. A primary goal of a relational approach to law practice
is to challenge and expand the reductive atomistic manner in which lawyers tend
to think about their work. In turn, a relational approach will change how lawyers
exercise judgment on behalf of clients, and how they come to offer advice.
Accordingly, a relational approach will change how lawyers communicate with
clients and how they advise clients. Viewed from this perspective, whether some
lawyers ultimately defer to their clients or in contrast decide to withdraw from the
representation of some clients is a secondary question. All lawyers, whether
atomistic or relational, must decide for themselves when disagreement becomes
“repugnant” and gives a lawyer cause to withdraw from representation under
Model Rule 1.16(b)(4).116
Indeed, we suggest that withdrawal could very well be less common in a
relational representation. Where atomistic representation could very well include
instructions, commands, and zero-sum conversations, a relational representation
necessarily requires client and lawyer to share information and values with each
other, making the potential for collaboration and cooperation more likely, even
where the parties disagree.
Next, what is a relational attorney to do if her client rejects not only the content
of relational advice but altogether the relational approach, for example, by
refusing to engage with the lawyer in the very ongoing conversations and
consulting that constitutes the relational attorney client relationship, insisting
instead on short and concise interactions framed in terms of narrow self-interest
and atomism? The emerging interdisciplinary relational literature strongly
suggests many clients will not reject a relational approach. As we have seen,
people tend to be more relational than the dominant atomistic approach assumes.
Atomism is not inherent to people, rather, it is culturally manufactured. To be
effective, atomism must be taught in order to overcome inherent relational
inclinations. In particular, emerging evidence about clients establishes that
clients, even large entity for-profit clients, are interested in forming mutually
beneficial relationships with their lawyers as opposed to shying away from
relational engagement.117 As it turns out, a relational approach to law practice is
good for business. Not surprisingly, it is the business approach of law firm
rainmakers who well understand the importance and value of building strong
relationships with clients.
For example, in a competitive market for legal services, in which elite large
law firm lawyers increasingly find themselves uninvolved in their clients’

116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.16(b)(4).
117. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?, supra note 56.
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strategic decision-making processes,118 and many solo and small law firm
lawyers struggle to find clients let alone develop the kinds of relationships
conducive to conversation about values and long term self-interest,119 relational
counseling will provide clients with superior long term strategic benefits. Former
General Electric General Counsel has made this point often in the corporate
context,120 as has Deborah Cantrell in the public interest arena.121 Although these
conversations and strategies might prove unfamiliar, alienating, and unpersuasive
if grounded in the variety of moral terms that critics of the dominant conception
have suggested, lawyers and clients steeped in atomistic self-interest might find
relational self-interest a more organic way to consider a range of values.
To be sure, some clients, seeking advice in the context of the dominant
individualistic culture, may very well expect their lawyers to manifest the
aggressive atomistic approach, and unthinkingly reject relational alternatives,
refusing to invest the necessary time and money to build a relational foundation.
A relational attorney, acting as a civics teacher, must, however, insist on
educating clients by introducing and modeling the relational approach. There is
no inconsistency between insisting on introducing relational content and building
a relational attorney-client relationship on the one hand, and ultimately deferring
to clients in the spirit of Rule 1.2(a), should a client insist on pursuing narrow
self-interest after contemplating relational alternatives. Indeed, these two aspects
of the relational attorney-client relationship are very much consistent: the
objective of a relational lawyer is to educate and inform in a dialogue with her
client, who will set the objectives of the relationship from an informed
perspective. Indeed, a dialogue resulting in a well-informed client decisionmaking is the objective of the relational approach.
Finally, a relational attorney might wonder whether a relational approach to
law practice serves her own interests, beyond whether clients would be interested
in it and willing to pay for it. Would not the relational approach, by definition, be
time-consuming, resulting in increased investment in existing client relationships
and a reduced opportunity to explore and form new lucrative relationships?
While certainly more time-consuming than a superficial lawyer-client interaction, the relational approach, counter-intuitively, may be the very approach
needed in a highly competitive and rapidly changing market for legal services. As

118. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 42, at 286–87.
119. See, e.g., G.M. Filisko, Turn-Around: Solos Seek Advice to Survive a Struggling Economy, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 2010, at 51 (discussing the difficulties faced by solo practitioners); Leigh Jones, Survey of Law Firm
Economics: Revenues Up at Larger Law Firms; Large Firms Saw Increases in 2012 While Small Firms
Struggled, NAT’L L.J., (Jul. 29, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id⫽1202612599398/Revenues-Upat-Larger-Law-Firms [https://perma.cc/F35Y-PVGY].
120. See BEN W. HEINEMAN JR., HIGH PERFORMANCE WITH HIGH INTEGRITY (2008); Heineman et al., supra
note 100, at 23–28.
121. See Cantrell, supra note 98, at 963–68.
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global competition, outsourcing included, in the market for legal services,122
increased competition by non-lawyer legal service providers,123 and technological advancements, artificial intelligence included,124 all suggest, lawyers are
already facing significant pressures to rethink and innovate their products and the
manner in which they produce and deliver them. A relational approach is an
example of the very innovation lawyers must adopt to stay relevant and
competitive: as other lawyers, non-lawyers and technology increasingly encroach
on traditional lawyers’ domains, relational attorneys should happily concede old
turf (which they cannot protect in any event) and use their new found time and
resources to focus on value-propositions in the attorney-client relationship,
including pursuing dialogues regarding advice and goals.
The daily practice of many lawyers could also change by practicing relational
self-interest. Lawyers would serve as America’s civic teachers by representing
clients. They would explain not only the letter of the law, but the meaning of
being a responsible member of the community.125 Today, most lawyers teach, if
only implicitly, atomistic self-interest to clients. Relational self-interest provides
a way to demonstrate to lawyers who in turn can explain to clients why they have
obligations to their neighbors and their community that transcend atomistic
self-interest. Relational self-interest explains that attorneys should discard the
dominant hired gun role that encourages clients to maximize their atomistic
self-interest without regard to implications for their neighbors or their community.
Changes to the daily practice of relational attorneys would include the nature
of conversations lawyers have with their clients as well as their frequency, and
the manner in which they advocate for clients. Relational self-interest provides a
bridge to more open and informative conversations with clients than the atomistic
model. As Bruni and Sugden observe, many people prefer to apply an ethic of
mutual benefit in all aspects of their life, including economic exchanges.126
Relational self-interest deconstructs the dichotomies between self-interest and
self-sacrifice, and between economic and social that too often obstruct our ability
to recognize the moral dimensions of our legal and economic relationships.127 In
so doing, it creates a space for lawyers to engage in relational counseling and to
urge their clients to view themselves as responsible members of a political
community.

122. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2010).
123. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205 (2014);
Barton, Lawyer’s Monopoly, supra note 1.
124. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014).
125. Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher, supra note 17, at 1213–14.
126. See, e.g., Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 38–40.
127. See id.
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Such counseling will produce dialogue, not paternalism.128 By definition,
paternalism is a non-dialogic approach where lawyers dictate to clients a course
of conduct. In a relational representation, lawyers honor the relationship with the
client and, as with all good relationships, facilitate a constructive discussion of
areas of agreement and disagreement regarding the responsibilities of lawyers
and clients. That contrasts with the dominant understanding that lawyers and
clients share a commitment to, and can only communicate regarding, atomistic
self-interest, where the atomistic conception thereby creates cardboard caricatures of clients and of lawyers. The result is not dialogue, but at best advice based
on limited and often inaccurate understandings of the client and at worst a type of
paternalism based on the lawyer’s crude stereotype that the client is, and should
be, solely atomistic.129 As Bruni and Sugden note,130 even people who consider
themselves atomistic incorporate relational elements into parts of their lives.
Relational counseling allows clients to share all of these elements and concerns.
Atomistic counseling shuts down—or does not draw out—the almost inevitable
relational concerns.
Relational counseling will therefore take place not only in specially designated
“relational conversations” or “moral counseling,”131 but in how lawyers come to
understand their clients’ problems and objectives, and, in turn, in the kind of
solutions they devise and recommend. Relational counseling that stems not from
purporting to take a moral high ground divorced from lawyers’ and clients’
understanding of the lawyer’s role, but rather that is inherent to lawyers’
conception of their job will be more seamless in its manifestations, more
integrated in every facet of practice, and therefore less likely to lead to friction
with clients.
Indeed, lawyers’ relational responsibility extends to how they advocate their
clients’ cause. Here, too, they have an opportunity to model dialogue and civility.
As long as lawyers, like their clients, subscribe to an atomistic vision of
unconstrained self-interest, talk of dialogue and civility with adversaries seems
inconsistent with zealous representation, rather than conduct that benefits both
client and lawyer in a relationally connected world. Imposing relational
responsibility on atomistic lawyers will likely only entail lawyers coming to have
a deeper relationship with their clients and a greater ability to promote the clients’
narrow goals.132 Once, however, lawyers begin to think of their own work in

128. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach
Would Improve Professional Rules and Roles, 2012 MICH. STATE L. REV. 513, 525–27, 534 (2012) [hereinafter
Pearce & Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation].
129. See Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 106
(2010) [hereinafter Kruse, Beyond Cardboard]; Wald & Pearce, Beyond Cardboard Lawyers, supra note 110.
130. Bruni & Sugden, supra note 17, at 51.
131. Pepper, supra note 113.
132. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation, supra note 128; Cantrell, supra note 98, at
963–68.
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broader terms, discussions of lawyers’ relational accountability for their practices
might make more sense, lead to more effective representations, and might allow
lawyers to meaningfully demonstrate to the clients a way of thinking richer than
self-interest.
Accordingly, a relational approach to law practice would insist on greater
civility among lawyers. Lawyers and law firms would be expected to extend
professional courtesies, avoid abusive tactics, treat opposing counsel and judges
with respect, and invest in firm cultures that encourage civil interactions. As we
argue elsewhere, lawyers must model and teach civility.
Lawyers must demonstrate mutual respect, courtesy, trust, and cooperation.
Civility starts in lawyers’ interactions with their own clients. It calls for
effective communications with clients, for prompt return of client calls and
requests for information, for reasonable updates regarding material developments in the case, and for respectful emails. Civility continues with polite and
respectful exchanges with lawyers’ own staff, opposing counsel, opposing
parties, witnesses, court personnel, and other third parties. It necessitates
refraining from the use of abusive language and tactics, such as name-calling
and the imposition of strategic delays and costs in litigation and business
negotiations.133

Importantly, “[t]eaching civility also includes demonstrating a commitment to
sustaining a space for communications and engagement, even in disagreement. It
includes modeling to clients the ability to ‘agree to disagree’ and the commitment
to ‘keep talking’ even when some substantive disagreements remain.”134 It is in
this sense that a relational approach to law practice will allow lawyers to act as
civics teachers and reclaim a meaningful place in the conversation over and
pursuit of the public good.135
Moreover, when lawyers pursue a relational approach to counseling, they open
conversations up to a plurality of values—including atomistic self-interest—and
will offer to society a model for how people with different opinions can engage in
respectful dialogue. In both civic and business culture, lawyers will remind
people that their long-term self-interest and basic values extend to all social
interactions so that hateful words or unrestrained greed are never appropriate and
that civility is in their relational self-interest. Today, for example, the atomistic
model has locked our civic dialogue into a cycle of incivility where political
actors see all differences as a zero-sum game,136 rather than as the subject for
dialogue between people who live together in a community or polity where they
cannot escape the relational implications of their interests.137 Relational counsel133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal, supra note 22, at 42 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 43–52.
Id. at 37–39.
See id.
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ing will provide an alternative model for mutual dialogue regarding even the
most contested differences. Illustrative of how this approach can operate even
under the most adverse conditions is Martin Luther King, Jr.’s advocacy for equal
rights for African-Americans in the face of racist, and often violent, White
opposition.138 King “counseled his followers to hate racism, not racists, and to
indicate that they were always open to reconciliation.”139
Perhaps most importantly, relational counseling will provide clients with more
effective and empowering representation. Once lawyers redefine their own
professional understandings to incorporate relational self-interest, it will infuse
every aspect of their representation of clients. Rather than practicing in a legal
universe that consists solely of atomistic self-interest and shapes and constrains
lawyers’ legal imagination, lawyers will come to understand legal challenges and
problems and thereafter avenues open to clients in much richer terms, informed
by an enhanced relational foundation.
C. RELATIONAL PLAUSIBILITY: PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY AND RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Lawyers are the primary source for explaining to people how to understand
their obligations to the law.140 Not only clients but also friends, neighbors, and
communities look to lawyers for guidance. Accordingly, even under the bad man
model of lawyering, lawyers continue to serve as civics teachers.141 They
implicitly teach clients that their primary obligation is to promote their narrow
self-interest within the bounds of the law and without regard to the good of their
neighbor or their community. The question then is whether, given the unsuccessful efforts of the bar and leading commentators, lawyers can be persuaded to
adopt a different approach to their role in civic leadership. Should lawyers
continue to teach atomistic self-interest—the perspective of the bad man? This
article asserts that atomistic self-interest is both descriptively and normatively
inadequate and that relational self-interest provides a superior alternative for
lawyers to embrace and teach to others. Yet, if both lawyers and clients want a
relational relationship, lawyers have long been, if only implicitly, civics teachers,
and a relational approach will result in more effective representations, why has it
not become a reality?
Both within and outside the practice of law, relational approaches run against
the homogony of the culture of atomistic narrow self-interest. This culture is
anything but an invisible wall; rather, it is a powerful force shaping and
informing the expectations and habits of lawyers and their clients alike. Before

138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 8.
Id.
See Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher, supra note 17, at 1213–14.
See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS, supra note 97, at 21–22.
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turning to explore how the culture of atomism may be challenged by lawyers
acting as civics teachers, it would be instructive to learn from history, specifically,
from how the dominant culture has undercut previous challenges to its
homogony.
David Luban and William Simon, and the many commentators that have
followed in their paths or related ones since the 1970s, compellingly explain that
the adversarial system does not require atomistic self-interest and that a
normative commitment to atomistic self-interest impairs the truth and justice
functions of the adversarial system.142 Moreover, a normative commitment to
atomistic self-interest leads lawyers to assist—or fail to prevent—illegal and
anti-social conduct by clients.143 Yet while Luban and Simon, as well as the other
commentators,144 were able to capture great interest in the academy and among
bar leaders, they were unable to break the powerful spell of atomistic self-interest
among lawyers.145
When common morality celebrates atomistic self-interest, individualism, and
capitalism, Luban’s moral activism does little to help lawyers move beyond their
role morality; and when law is reduced to supporting and facilitating atomistic
self-interest, Simon’s commitment to substantive justice is unpersuasive to
lawyers who have come to understand themselves and their clients as Holmesian
bad men.146 In other words, Luban and Simon correctly diagnose the symptoms
of atomistic self-interest but fail to effectively overcome it because they continue
to work within the system and assumptions of atomistic self-interest. Put
differently, as daunting and challenging the cultural homogony of atomistic
self-interest may be—and it is nothing short of a monumental task—previous
attempts by leading scholars of the legal profession to challenge the hired gun
ideology have failed exactly because they did not challenge the very culture that
legitimizes, produces and sustains this ideology. A relational approach to law
practice will only succeed and thrive if it does not shy away from challenging the
very culture that aims to undermine it.
As Sen, Bruni, and Sugden assert, compared with atomistic self-interest,
relational self-interest more accurately describes, both descriptively and normatively, the conduct, thinking, and desires of clients and lawyers alike.147 The
142. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6; SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.
143. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers? The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN.
L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003); Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069,
2112–14 (2011).
144. See infra notes 224–25 for a list of other commentators.
145. Empirical evidence across practice areas and hemispheres suggesting that lawyers identify with their
clients is instructive here. As lawyers increasingly identify with their clients’ goals, they come to think of their
clients’ objectives as consistent with substantive justice and are less likely to engage in moral counseling
contrary to their clients’ goals. Luban and Simon’s compelling analytical posture ends up as a theoretical
exercise practicing lawyers may be committed to but never actually come to apply.
146. Supra note 145.
147. See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
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prevalence of atomistic self-interest is therefore not the product of either some
fundamental fact of human nature or of superior normative justifications. Rather,
as we have argued above, atomistic self-interest has been culturally and
ideologically manufactured by powerful cultural, social, and political forces and
interests, vetted through the marketplace and legal arenas.148 In the 21st century,
individualistic, unconstrained atomistic self-interest has gained cult, near untouchable status as a cornerstone of the American dream.149 But there is nothing
inevitable about it. It is a product of American culture and law, and it is up to
American culture and law to restrain it. Importantly, therefore, there is nothing
illegitimate about promoting relational self-interest, and, in particular, nothing
inappropriate about lawyers promoting relational self-interest. Therefore, challenging atomistic self-interest would be a monumental task, but it is not morally
illegitimate.
This very aspect of relational self-interest—its legitimacy—differentiates it
from previous attempts to attack the “standard conception” of lawyers as extreme
partisans without moral accountability for their actions or those of their clients
within the bounds of the law.150 Simon’s powerful call for practicing law
consistent with substantive justice has—wrongly—been criticized by many as
both paternalistic towards clients and implausible given the pluralistic society we
live in with its rich, diverse, and legitimately conflicting values.151 If, as we
explain in greater detail below,152 Simon rejects paternalism, why do critics so
often describe him as offering an account of lawyers and law practice that is
paternalistic to clients? We believe that arguments based on morality, substantive
justice, and the public good are alien to the dominant atomistic paradigm, which
views all behavior as narrowly self-interested and any other claims as misleading,153 manipulative,154 or private and not properly part of the public sphere.155
Under any of these conditions, values are not susceptible to dialogue, and Simon
is unfairly dismissed as advocating for lawyers as philosopher kings who
dominate their clients at the same time as they are themselves required to
demonstrate Herculean efforts to practice law.
Professional ideologies, rules of professional conduct and practice realities
based on relational self-interest would not be subject to the same critique. They
would reflect the normative desires of clients (and lawyers) and would not be
thought of as usurping the moral authority, decision-making and autonomy of
clients. In particular, relational self-interest would not require Herculean moral
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
See Kruse, Beyond Cardboard, supra note 129, at 154.
See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 236–41 and accompanying text.
See Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1359.
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Pearce, Blue State, supra note 3, at 1359.
See Anthony T. Kronman, Civility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 727, 731 (1996).
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efforts and language foreign to lawyers and clients alike. In contrast to the
language of substantive justice, relational self-interest uses language that can
appeal to lawyers who think of themselves as hired guns or as business people
instead of professionals. Grounded in the self-interest that arises from understanding all people and organizations as inter-connected, relational self-interest begins
from the familiar starting point of self-interest, as opposed to grand moral
arguments that appear irrelevant or inappropriate to those socialized in a culture
of atomistic self-interest. Instead, relational self-interest embraces integrating
and discussing client and lawyer values in an organic manner, as part and parcel
of communicating and building a relational attorney-client relationship. Indeed,
relational self-interest promotes traditional professional values, such as loyalty,
trust, civility, and the public good.156
Language alone, however, is not going to help relational lawyers overcome the
dominant culture of atomistic self-interest. Developing a full account of lawyers’
professional ideology, role morality, and rules of conduct premised on relational
self-interest falls outside the scope of this article. Indeed, if we succeed in
exposing the pervasive influence of atomistic self-interest, and help start a
discourse exploring professional ideology and role based on relational selfinterest, this article would achieve its goals. Nonetheless, we conclude this
section with some preliminary thoughts about the meaning and shape of a
professional world premised on relational self-interest.
While the “standard conception” is a natural outgrowth of atomistic selfinterest, neither extreme partisanship nor moral non-accountability require
rejection of relational self-interest. For example, advocates of the standard
conception, such as Monroe Freedman, Abbe Smith, and Stephen Pepper, have
also supported robust conceptions of dialogue that could include relational
self-interest.157 On the other hand, the standard conception is certainly consistent
with the atomistic bad man perspective and some commentators have combined
the standard conception with the atomistic ban to exclude relational self-interest
from lawyer-client dialogue.
Accordingly, to move beyond atomistic self-interest, lawyers’ professional
ideology would have to be re-conceptualized and re-imagined. This, of course,
has been the ongoing project of many leading legal ethics scholars,158 a project
that to date has been unsuccessful because of its inability to produce an attractive
and compelling alternative to atomistic self-interest. Relational self-interest,
which is consistent with these theorists and the work of many others, opens the
door to the development of a new theory of lawyering and the construction of a
new professional ideology.

156. See Remus, supra note 17.
157. See infra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6; Shaffer, supra note 17; SIMON, PRACTICE
JUSTICE, supra note 6; WENDEL, supra note 17.
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What would such ideology look like? Instead of bad man partisanship,
lawyers’ professional ideology could be premised on relational partisanship and
competence, akin to agents’ and fiduciaries’ duty of care. Yet, unlike the duty of
care of corporate officers and directors, lawyers would not benefit from a near
absolute protection of a doctrine similar to the business judgment rule.159
Lawyers’ exercise of professional judgment would be subject to substantive, not
only procedural, scrutiny, although the scrutiny would largely occur among the
community of lawyers and clients, not as a matter of law.160
Next, instead of moral non-accountability, lawyers will remain relationally
responsible for the consequences of their practice—as in fact they descriptively
are. This would not mean, by any stretch of the imagination, compromised
loyalty to clients. Indeed, it is compatible with both partisan- and responsibilityoriented conceptions of lawyering.161 Rather, instead of atomistic, unconstrained,
and arguably ineffective loyalty to clients, lawyers would owe clients a duty of
loyalty that means more than avoidance of conflicts of interest. It would
encompass a fiduciary commitment to wise counseling and representation.
Finally, lawyers’ competent representation of clients would embody relational
perspectives that would include the spirit, as well as the letter, of the law, as
Simon and Wendel assert, and would also incorporate conceptions of the public
good, similar to the responsible zealous advocacy of traditional professionalism.162 No doubt, a professional ideology based on competent, relationally
accountable representation is a far cry from partisan non-accountability of the
dominant account’s bad man lawyer.163 But as Luban, Simon and others have
shown,164 most lawyers do not find such an approach compelling. Even within
the confines of the adversary system in the criminal law context, partisan
non-accountability is not necessary to ensure effective representation. At the end
of the day, as Bruni and Sugden point out, and the MBA Oath movement
evidences,165 many clients, like lawyers, yearn for relational self-interest as an
alternative to atomistic self-interest.166 Explaining to them that they could and
should conduct themselves in a way consistent with how they live their lives
generally will reinforce this inclination.

159. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1139, 1145–48 (2012) (discussing the duty of care and the business judgment rule).
160. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1805 (2002).
161. Id. (identifying proponents of various perspectives on the lawyer’s role construct of moral accountability).
162. Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of American Indian Tribal
Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085, 3145–52 (2013); see also Gordon, Independence, supra note 3.
163. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
165. See generally ANDERSON & ESCHER, supra note 79.
166. See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
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As to rules of professional conduct that breathe life into and implement
professional ideologies, the legal profession’s Rules are currently strained to the
point of internal contradiction. Retaining the language of duties to the courts and
the legal system as officers of the legal system and to the public good as public
citizens,167 the Model Rules struggle to cope with the prevalence of atomistic
self-interest. As many commentators pointed out, revisions to the Model Rules in
recent years, such as the addition of numerous exceptions to confidentiality in
Rule 1.6(b) and 1.13(c), are a poor fit within the atomistic self-interest
ideology.168 Yet while commentators have used this observation to try and defeat
recent amendments to provide these exceptions,169 it also serves the opposite
goal of helping demonstrate that we need to rethink and have conversations
regarding the rules of professional conduct in light of the relational reality of law
practice.
Indeed, relational self-interest helps lawyers fulfill some of their existing
obligations under the Model Rules. The Model Rules permit lawyers to encourage
relational self-interest. For example, Rule 1.2 and Rule 2.1 conform to mutual
benefit, including respect for client dignity, as commentators as diverse as Luban,
Freedman, and Smith would suggest or, even better from our perspective,
relational autonomy to use Nedelsky’s phrase.170
More importantly, relational self-interest better reinforces lawyers’ duties as
officers of the legal system and as public citizens. Relational self-interest can
better explain exceptions to confidentiality and duties to non-clients. It would
provide a language for debating confidentiality,171 and mandatory or discretionary disclosures, that would encompass the contrasting views of relational
commentators. Similarly, it would offer a context for considering accountability
for providing legal services to indigent clients, whether through mandatory pro
bono or other measures that recognize how equal justice is important to
maintaining community as a web of relationships. Next, relational self-interest as
it applies to lawyers would require regulation of law firms at the firm level, doing
away with the unreasonable—and detached from practice realities—emphasis of
the Model Rules on individual atomistic lawyers as the basic exclusive unit of
regulation.172 Finally, relational self-interest could accommodate new rules that

167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2015).
168. See Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving The Tension Between Confidentiality
Requirements And Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 246–50 (2007).
169. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277
(2003) (arguing for a broad confidentiality rule).
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.2, 2.1 (2015); see also Laurel S. Terry et al., Trends and
Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2661,
2665–66 (2012). For a discussion of the concept of relational autonomy, see Nedelsky, supra note 17, at 38–65.
171. William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2004, at 113.
172. Wald, Resizing, supra note 99, at 278-82.
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would better accord with the representation of co-clients and collaborative
lawyering than the existing conflicts rules grounded in atomistic self-interest.
Moreover, relational self-interest opens the door to a conception of rules of
professional conduct that will suggest new approaches to regulation of legal
services providers. For example, following in the footsteps of the United
Kingdom,173 relational commitments may lead to the development of principlesbased regulatory schemes and may apply to all providers of legal services,
whether lawyers or not. “These approaches recognize that relationships within
firms are essential to promoting ethical conduct and they create a reciprocal
relationship between regulators and those they regulate,”174 and may include
recognizing the fostering of relational self-interest as a goal of regulation. Such
regulation will pay attention to “how law firms develop and implement their own
ethical identities and plans,”175 develop “ethical guidelines [that] view the
lawyer-client relationship as fully relational and promote dialogue that would
more likely include discussion of relational self-interest,”176 and the creation of
“vehicles for small and solo practitioners to obtain the benefit of firm type
regulation,”177 such as organization “through bar associations, inns of court, or
their own groups, to establish affinity alliances of small and solo practices that
would work together to develop their own regulatory plans, including ways to
assist and monitor each other without breaching duties of confidentiality and
loyalty.”178
There is no denying that the road to introducing a workable, viable relational
approach to law practice is a long one, given the dominance of the opposing
atomistic model, and that relational lawyers would have to do battle with
powerful cultural forces which legitimize narrow self-interest. Law, it is worth
repeating, is not going to be able to fashion a successful counter attack on
unconstrained self-interest all by itself, but it must try, with lawyers as civics
teachers leading the way. And, at least within law, the development of relational
professional ideologies and corresponding rules of professional responsibility
utilizing the familiar language of relational self-interest would constitute an
important step in the right direction.
Other aspects of the relational approach to law practice may help in fighting
the cultural battle. Relational self-interest provides lawyers with a way to
understand the value of their work, increase job satisfaction, and decrease
substance abuse and anxiety-related mental illness in a manner consistent with
173. See Julian Webb, The Future of the Legal Profession: Article: Regulating Lawyers in a Liberalized
Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 543–47 (2013)
(describing the United Kingdom’s Legal Services Act of 2007).
174. Pearce & Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation, supra note 128, at 533–34.
175. Id. at 534.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 535.
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how members of the bar conceive of their role with regard to their clients. It
offers bar leaders an effective way to promote these values, in contrast to the
reliance on professional rhetoric that has proven ineffective. When lawyers as
individuals and as a community employ the framework of relational self-interest
to conduct themselves as relationally responsible business people, they will find
that their work is full of passion and reward. Their work will, of course, continue
to be stressful. Nonetheless, they will understand why their work has meaning
and will have more tools to manage stress. Moreover, insofar as many of the
demands in balancing work and other responsibilities have a moral dimension,
recognition of the moral implications of lawyer conduct will make consideration
of balance more visible and more acceptable. As a result of these changes,
lawyers should experience a significant improvement from the current experience
of high rates of job dissatisfaction, substance abuse, and anxiety-related mental
illness.179
D. RELATIONALITY IN THE WORKPLACE

Unfortunately, significant cultural hurdles are not the only powerful force
relational attorneys would have to do battle with, as institutional dynamics also
cement and legitimize atomistic self-interest. Just as American lawyers have
grown increasingly more devoted to atomism and narrow self-interest, so have
the institutions that house them. American law firms, large and small, increasingly embody the culture of atomism, adopting hiring, promotion and organizational policies and procedures that reward atomism and diminish the likelihood
of relational alternatives. The adoption of the billable hour as the predominant
measure of assessing productivity and the subsequent increase in billable
targets,180 the demise of lock-step compensation and rise of eat-what-you-kill
schemes,181 increased mobility and resulting decreased long-term loyalty to the
workplace,182 decline in mentoring and training,183 the adoption of multiple
tracks of partnerships,184 and installing rainmaking equity partners on the top of
the professional pyramid all have the potential to serve, support and legitimize
the fetish of narrow self-interest and reduce the space for relational alternatives
at the workplace.

179. See generally Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15.
180. WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS 9-22 (1996);
Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the
Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 246-47 (2000).
181. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big
Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1906 (2008); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A
WALL STREET LAWYER (2004).
182. Wald, supra note 168, at 199-200.
183. Pearce & Wald, Relational Infrastructure, supra note 45, at 117.
184. William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the AM Law
200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691 (2006).
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A relational approach to law practice would apply with equal force to a
lawyer’s interactions and relationships with lawyers and non-lawyers alike, both
within one’s firm and outside of it. Indeed, many of the particular strategies
employed to promote atomistic organizational cultures, such as hourly billing,
shifting from lock-step compensation to greater reward for rainmakers, lateral
hiring, or multiple partnership tracks, could just as easily survive with a different
function in a relational organizational culture. Within a firm, consider recent
laments regarding the decline of training and mentoring185 at BigLaw.186 As
in-house counsel increased their prestige and power compared to outside counsel,
entity clients have begun to more closely scrutinize the staffing and billing habits
of large law firms, often refusing to pay for the training and mentoring of junior
associates.187 At the same time, increased competitive pressures have raised
billing and business development expectations of BigLaw partners, making them
less willing and less able to train and mentor; and rendered their law firms less
willing to cover the cost of training and mentoring.188 Who then, commentators
caution, will train and mentor the next generation of large law firm lawyers?
The concern looms large under the dominant paradigm in which large law firm
partners and entity clients all aggressively pursue their own atomistic selfinterests, but may be somewhat less disconcerting should an alternative relational
approach emerge. Relational partners would consider associates counterparts in
social exchanges and would train and mentor them, realizing that the investment
carries a mutual benefit. BigLaw as relational entities might accept somewhat
lower profit margins and would not only tolerate but indeed incentivize its
partners to mentor, train and invest in cultivating a more relational culture.
Associates, contrary to the teachings of the prevailing ideology, would not treat
training and mentoring as an arm’s length exchange, their reward for the long
hours they have committed to the firm, but instead might invest in the mutual
relationship with training partners and mentors.189 General Counsel, in turn,
might be willing to work their tight budgets to cover some of law firms’ training
and mentoring costs.
Next, consider the ongoing trend of increased use of contract lawyers at
BigLaw. Under the dominant paradigm, commentators have correctly described
the trend as creating second-class citizens, lawyers who are ill-treated by partners
and associates, who have little chance of securing professional status and

185. Pearce & Wald, Relational Infrastructure, supra note 45, at 118–20.
186. “The term “BigLaw” generally refers to the largest law firms in the [world].” See Lawrence Friedman &
Louis Schulze, Not Everyone Works for BigLaw: A Response to Neil J. Dilloff, 71 MD. L. REV. 41, 41 n.3 (2012).
187. Pearce & Wald, Relational Infrastructure, supra note 45, at 131, 135.
188. Id. at 116–17, 135.
189. Id. at 135–37.
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benefits, resulting in increased stratification within the profession.190 Atomistic
self-interest does legitimize the marginalization of contract lawyers by clients,
partners, and associates who accurately perceive contract attorneys as means to
an end—the maximization of their narrow self-interest. A relational approach,
however, would mandate treating contract lawyers respectfully and providing
them with reasonable opportunities to develop their professional careers, either
within or outside of BigLaw.
As the saying goes, old habits die hard, and old institutional habits grounded in
a dominant ideology and culture that celebrate atomistic self-interest will die
even harder, especially as powerful equity partners—the big winners of the
atomistic approach to law practice—increasingly consolidate their power at the
top of BigLaw.191 The dominance of atomistic self-interest within legal
institutions should not be underestimated, and aspiring relational attorneys at
BigLaw would be naı̈ve to believe otherwise. Yet the relational opportunity is
there.192 Lawyers, including lawyers who join and stay at large law firms, not
only seek relational alternatives to the dominant atomistic approach but will find
that consciousness of relational factors will help develop the most effective
strategies for furthering career goals given that relational factors most accurately
describe the descriptive context even of a workplace where colleagues and clients
employ atomistic rhetoric. Indeed, many clients, including large entity clients,
demand relational advice and partnerships from their lawyers.193 Relational
institutions, including law firms, have much to gain from adopting relational
policies and procedures.
E. RELATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION

Other legal institutions, law schools included, would have to adjust as well,
abandoning the culture of atomistic self-interest and developing relational
alternatives. As we establish elsewhere:
[l]aw schools form law students as competitive and adversarial professionals
who are taught to believe that it is legitimate, and indeed desirable, to pursue
aggressively the interests of their clients, as well as their own interests, without
regard to the interests of their colleagues, neighbors, and communities. Law
schools teach law students to view their classmates as competitors and pursue
their own [atomistic] self-interest as students. [Atomistically] self-interested
law students grow into [atomistically] self-interested attorneys, but law schools

190. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social
Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1189 (2008) (“With temporary attorneys, large law
firms appear to have created a new lawyer underclass.”).
191. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 181, at 1898 n.123, 1913; Henderson, supra note 184; see generally,
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988).
192. See supra notes 117-21 and corresponding text.
193. See supra note 117.
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do not stop there. Rather, they teach students to understand their clients as
[atomistically] self-interested, and to pursue their clients’ [atomistic] selfinterest at the expense of their clients’ relational self-interest in considering the
interests of opposing parties, third parties, the public good, and the spirit of the
law. Indeed, the law itself is taught as a morally-free zone, a body of abstract
principles subject to manipulation, in which the public interest is nothing more
than an aggregate of clients’ private interests, and in which a lawyer’s role is to
pursue aggressively her client’s [atomistic] self-interest.194

Yet law schools can become arenas of reform, where law students are
reacquainted with and immersed in relational approaches. Legal education can
and should explain professional values in terms of relational self-interest, revise
its traditional curriculum, for example, by un-teaching “atomistic thinking like a
lawyer” to mean “atomistic zealous advocacy on behalf of clients” and teaching
instead relational thinking like a lawyer and zealous advocacy, including a deep
commitment to the quality of justice in our society, and making the formation of
professional identity a cornerstone of its mission.195 If nothing else, the current
culture of atomistic self-interest makes legal ethics a second-rate course.196 A
relational framework would make ethics a primary focus of legal education,
perhaps with the addition of a first year course that helps lawyers understand their
connection to the economic, social, and political well-being of society, as well as
to their resulting responsibilities. In other words, the course will have to go above
and beyond coverage of the rules of professional conduct and serve as an arena in
which students can first come to experience and develop a challenging and
rewarding foundation for their future law practice.197 In addition, pervasive
ethics initiatives will help build and instill in law students a commitment to
professional values that will have both a more persuasive grounding and a more
pressing claim on the student’s allegiance in the context of relational self-interest.
Accepting the framework of relational self-interest extends beyond individual
accountability to the community of lawyers. The bar’s obligations fall within two
broad categories: promoting institutional arrangements that will best advance a
just society and supporting lawyers in their efforts to live up to their individual
obligations. Taking these responsibilities seriously will require significant
reforms. For example, our society routinely denies equal justice to those who
cannot afford legal representation or cannot afford representation equal to that of

194. Wald & Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, supra note 16, at 415 (internal citations omitted). See id. at
415–29 for a detailed analysis of the ways in which law schools adhere to and teach atomistic self-interest. In the
previous article, we used the term “autonomous self-interest” to describe the concept that we are now calling
“atomistic self-interest.”
195. See id. at 433–40.
196. See Eli Wald, Book Review, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 311–12 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL,
LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008)).
197. See Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law
School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 722 (1998).
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their adversary. Thus far, efforts to redress unequal justice have been limited to
rhetoric or to pro bono and public service programs that have at best a marginal
impact. In the context of the dominance of atomistic self-interest these limited
efforts make sense. In a world exclusively informed by autonomy, individualism,
and self-interest, access to legal services is primarily thought of in terms of
private access to the law for those who are able to pay for it.
Relational self-interest and the understanding that our fates are all interconnected open the door to the conceptualization of broader reforms. In order to
provide greater access to legal services for low and middle income persons, the
bar should permit businesses to provide legal services so long as they satisfy
minimum standards of ethics and quality.198 Similarly, to promote more diversity
within the bar and encourage access to legal services, a college degree in law
should become the ticket for bar admission, as it is in most of the world and was
in the United States prior to the 1930s.199

III. THE FALSE DICHOTOMIES OF PROFESSIONALISM CRISIS DISCOURSE
Importantly, a relational discourse moves the legal profession forward by
offering a way to resolve the professionalism crisis. As Thomas Kuhn has
explained, debates regarding core understandings mark a paradigm crisis like
the crisis of professionalism.200 Not surprisingly, accompanying the collapse of
the business-profession dichotomy, controversies arose related to the role of the
lawyer, job satisfaction, and the unity of the legal profession.201 This Part
explains how the paradigm crisis has caused a mistaken understanding that the
different approaches to these four issues are inevitably irreconcilable dichotomies, rather than reasonable disagreements subject to reconciliation and dialogue. Next, it shows that commentators are beginning to move beyond the crisis
of professionalism and the perception of irreconcilable dichotomies at the core of
professional identity. Finally, it argues that a relational approach helps dispel the
false dichotomies and is consistent with recent approaches to professionalism and
emerging theories of law practice.

198. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Sinna Nasseri, The Virtue of Low Barriers to Becoming a Lawyer:
Promoting Liberal and Democratic Values, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 357 (2012); John O. McGinnis & Russell D.
Mangas, An Undergraduate Option for Legal Education, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 117 (2014).
199. See Pearce & Nasseri, supra note 198; McGinnis & Mangas, supra note 198; see also Elizabeth
Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 830–34 (2000)
(discussing the history of legal education requirements in the U.S.); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Intellectual
Property, Innovation, and the Future: Toward a Better Model for Educating Leaders in Intellectual Property
Law, 64 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2011) (noting that “[i]n most countries, law is an undergraduate degree”).
200. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 47–48, 88 (2d ed. 1970); see also Pearce,
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1234–37 (describing Kuhn’s theory of paradigms).
201. See infra Part III.B and Part III.C.
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A. THE BUSINESS-PROFESSION DICHOTOMY

In their account of the crisis of professionalism, leading lawyers and legal
scholars described business behavior and professionalism as inherently in
tension.202 In fact, the dichotomy between business and profession, while a
rhetorical commitment, never accurately reflected the reality of lawyers’ work. If
lawyers are relational, then their work relationships necessarily incorporate
elements of both a business and a traditional profession.
Indeed, over time, the claim that professionals were guardians of the public
good had narrowed in reaction to popular skepticism.203 The confidence of the
framers, as well as antebellum legal ethicists David Hoffman and George
Sharswood, that professionals had superior virtue gave way after the Civil War to
the narrower claim that lawyers’ training and experience provided them with
superior expertise and disinterested independence.204 After the 1960s, the claim
narrowed again so that beyond a vague justification for lawyer self-regulation,
the commitment to the public good was outside of most lawyers’ every day
work—pro bono clients and support for public interest lawyers.205
But even from the beginning of sincere faith in the business-profession
dichotomy as the basis for lawyers’ civic leadership, lawyers earned their
livelihoods and prestige from their work, inevitably providing a self-interested
motive not very dissimilar from that of business people that co-existed with a
belief in public responsibilities that enabled lawyers to obtain the exclusive right
to practice law and to claim the prestige and influence of civic leadership.
The cultural change after the 1960s that created the crisis of professionalism
and viewed every motivation as atomistically self-interested had a similarly
one-dimensional understanding of lawyer conduct that denied the possibility that
lawyers or their clients would choose long term self-interest, moral responsibility, or conduct other than instrumental manipulation. Yet, while the dominant
rhetoric promoted atomistic self-interest, the reality of law practice has always
reflected aspects of relational self-interest. In the big firm setting, David Wilkins
has demonstrated that lawyer-client relationships are coming to resemble the
reciprocal and mutually beneficial relations of businesses with long-term
suppliers.206 Moreover, lawyers are increasing pro bono hours207 and pro bono
practice serves both a public good and lawyer self-interest in terms of prestige
and training.

202. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.
203. See Pearce, American Lawyer’s Role, supra note 23, at 383–84.
204. See id. at 384–95.
205. Id. at 383–84, 419–20.
206. See Wilkins, Team of Rivals?, supra note 56, at 2097.
207. See, e.g., Victor Marrero, Pro Bono Legal Services: The Silent Majority—a Twenty-five Year
Retrospective, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1317, 1334–36 (2014) (describing that mandatory pro bono reporting
requirements have increased the number of pro bono hours being reported).
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Not surprisingly, then, after a generation where bar and academic leaders
lamented the end of the business-profession dichotomy, more and more scholars
and leaders are arguing that the business aspect of legal practice does not prevent
commitment to the public good. While the trend in the 1990s was to bemoan
business conduct by lawyers, the trend in the twenty-first century has been
different, with leading scholars acknowledging that law has always been to some
extent a business and rejecting traditional professionalism’s contention that
professional lawyers should have the exclusive privilege to practice law. They
agree that non-lawyers should be able to provide some or all legal services, either
expressly or implicitly rejecting the application of the business-profession
dichotomy.208 In doing so, they have adopted relational perspectives that view
legal work and legal workers as requiring a range of expertise and participating in
a range of relationships, as opposed to the one size fits all and zero sum
perspective of the business-profession dichotomy. Removing the presumption
that only professional lawyers can ethically and competently provide all legal
services opens the possibility of a range of relational perspectives to legal work.
Tom Morgan, for example, long a leading professional responsibility scholar,
has observed that “very good people have tried to make something of the
professional rhetoric, but we are a long way from [those] grandiose claims . . . .
In my view, professionalism in the sense developed by the A.B.A. during the
twentieth century is—and should be seen as—dead.”209 But Morgan sees
opportunity in this transformation. He asserts that “[l]awyers, like all citizens,
have a moral obligation to devote their best efforts to using their skills in ways
that contribute to the public interest”210 and observes that “consumers of legal
services are likely to reward providers” who adopt the business ethic of
“deliver[ing] services more efficiently and at lower costs.”211 According to
Morgan, this will increase access to justice and will not undermine lawyer’s
values.212 Morgan notes that “[t]hose values have not and will not go out of
date . . . . The lives of practitioners using legal training, whatever their number or
the nature of their individual training and practice, will be the best instruments of
justice.”213 To Morgan, whether lawyers or not, legal services providers can serve
the public good. Morgan is only one of a number of distinguished scholars who

208. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2015) [hereinafter BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL]; THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER
(2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the Corporate Practice of
Law (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2183978 [https://perma.cc/7MMT-6KRS]; Renee Newman Knake,
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2012); Remus, supra note 17; Rhode, Law,
Lawyers, supra note 12, at 1553; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3.
209. MORGAN, supra note 208, at 68–69.
210. Id. at 69.
211. Id. at 232.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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have argued—contrary to the business-profession dichotomy—that increased
competition would lower the price and improve the quality of services and
thereby increase access to justice.214
Dana Remus and Rebecca Roiphe also reject the business-profession dichotomy, but in a way that differs from Morgan. Whereas Morgan seeks to
replace the business-profession dichotomy with a business, or market, ideology
which has inherent guarantees of the public interest, Remus and Roiphe seek to
“redefine” and “reconstruct” professionalism in ways that reject the businessprofession dichotomy,215 but oppose a largely market driven approach to
delivering legal services as well. Remus asserts that the tension between
commercialism and professionalism,
cannot be resolved through an embrace of market forces any more than it can be
hidden behind traditional rhetoric of professionalism and commitment to the
public interest. Rather, it must be continually mediated and managed through
professional structures and ethical rules that harness market forces in productive rather than protective ways.216

Roiphe, in turn, argues that professional “independence is an aspect of
professional identity rather than a condition that results from the isolation of
lawyers from businessmen and others[.]”217 Roiphe asserts that the danger to
professional independence arises not “from innovative markets, sources of
funding, or new law firm structures” but rather from “proposals to segment the
profession in ways that might erode a common identity” that “has consistently
provided a language for debating the nature of the lawyer’s role in a democracy.”218
The bar, as well, is reconsidering its fixation on the business-profession
dichotomy. The State of Washington has drawn great attention for its experiment
in permitting paralegals to provide limited family representation.219 As other
jurisdictions consider similar measures,220 the delivery of legal services is being
de facto deregulated through consumer software, like Legal Zoom, and nonlawyer businesses providing discovery and contract management. In response,
214. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 1, at 390; Hadfield, supra note 208; Deborah L. Rhode, Reforming
American Legal Education and Legal Practice: Rethinking Licensing Structures and the Role of Nonlawyers in
Delivering and Financing Legal Services, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 243 (2013).
215. See Remus, supra note 17; Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3.
216. Remus, supra note 17, at 5.
217. Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3, at 196.
218. Id.
219. See Remus, supra note 17, at 8; WSBA, http://www.wsba.org/licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limitedlicenses/legal-technicians [https://perma.cc/8WWH-YB8T] (last visited July 30, 2016) (“Washington is the first
state in the country to offer an affordable legal support option to help meet the needs of those unable to afford
the service of an attorney. Legal Technicians, also known as Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLT), are
trained and licensed to advise and assist people going through divorce, child custody and other family-law
matters in Washington.”).
220. Laurel A. Rigertas, Collaborations Between Lawyers And New Legal Professionals: A Path To Increase
Access To Justice And Protect Clients, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 542 (2015).
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the bar has slowly begun to explore the possibility of regulating legal services
alongside lawyers,221 implicitly acknowledging that non-lawyers can provide
legal services.
In rejecting the business-profession dichotomy, these varied perspectives share
an understanding that law work is relational and that law workers are both
business people and professionals at the same time. In this way, they offer a way
to overcome the crisis of professionalism through a relational perspective.
B. THE LAWYER’S ROLE

As described above, accompanying the crisis of professionalism was a shift in
the dominant lawyer’s role from the structural-functionalist vision of zealous
advocates who self-consciously served as intermediaries between the people and
the law to zealous advocates who were extreme partisans without moral
accountability or responsibility for the public good. Consistent with the
increasing emphasis on individualism and on self-interest both critics and
defenders of extreme partisanship described it in terms of Holmesian bad men
lawyers representing Holmesian bad men clients.222 Clients sought to get away
with what they could within the bounds of the law. In representing clients’ goals,
lawyers did the same. The resulting binary was lawyer as Holmesian bad man
hired gun versus lawyer as structural-functionalist civics teacher. From a
relational perspective, however, most perspectives are neither wholly atomistic
nor wholly paternalistic.
As the debate developed, advocates of both paradigms offered a wide range of
rationales and applications. Arguments justifying extreme partisanship included
respect for individual autonomy, value pluralism, and the adversary system.223
Criticisms began with David Luban and William Simon’s assessment of the
adversary system as a flawed mechanism for justice, and their proposals for
lawyer responsibility for the public good, Luban from extralegal morality and
Simon from the internal substantive perspective of a just legal system.224 Other

221. ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services, Resolution 105 Revised and
Amended Resolution 105, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016mymres/105.
pdf (Feb. 2016) [https://perma.cc/6S5S-MFSZ] [hereinafter Model Regulatory Objectives]; see ABA PolicyMaking Body Adopts Principles to Guide Courts in Regulating of Legal Service Providers, ABA (Feb. 8, 2016)
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/02/aba_policy-makingbo.html [https://
perma.cc/RM5P-KRDB]; see also McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 124, at 3057-59; see also BARTON, GLASS
HALF FULL, supra note 208, at 88–97; MORGAN, supra note 208, at 95–98.
222. See, e.g., DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE
(2011); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6; Christine Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers:
Professional Ethics and Business Compliance With Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2009); Schwartz,
supra note 6, at 672–74; W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1473, 1487 (2006).
223. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 1.08 (4th ed.
2010) (value pluralism) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, LAWYERS’ ETHICS].
224. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6; SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.
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scholars soon offered other ways of extending the lawyers’ role beyond the
promotion of the Holmesian bad man client on the basis of value pluralism,
relational feminism, critical race theory, religious commitments, and a reconceptualization of the lawyer as civics teacher.225
While advocates generally painted the extreme partisan visions and alternative
visions as binary, the actual distinctions were far more complex. Outside of a
very few commentators who argued for a Holmesian bad man gloss on the
extreme partisan, most—even the most prominent defenders of the hired gun
role,226 were open to lawyers integrating their personal views into certain
dimensions of law practice, such as whether to represent a client, and to engaging
in mutually respectful dialogue regarding long term self-interest, morality, and
the public good.227 Similarly, for advocates of the various perspectives on
morally responsible lawyering, the default was zealous representation, even for
clients with whom the lawyer disagreed.228 As a general matter, these scholars
reserved refusal to represent, or withdrawal from representation, for the extreme
case—not everyday lawyer work—and advocated for respectful counseling of
clients, not overriding the clients’ decisions and disregarding clients’ autonomy.229 With the exception of Thomas Shaffer, they rejected the label of
paternalism230 and even Shaffer’s paternalism resembles Buber’s I-Thou dialogue,231 more than the caricature of a paternalistic lawyer disregarding the
client’s views in order to promote the lawyer’s view of the client’s best interest.
Indeed, Shaffer and Bob Cochran, advocates of morally responsible lawyering,
urge lawyers to represent clients whose behavior they might find reprehensible.232

225. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996)
(addressing religious values); SHAFFER, supra note 93 (addressing religious values); VISCHER, supra note 17
(addressing religious values); WENDEL, supra note 17 (addressing value pluralism); Derrick Bell, Racial
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1992) (addressing critical race theory); Cahn, supra note 93 (addressing
relational feminism); Green & Pearce, Lawyer as Civics Teacher, supra note 17 (addressing civics teachers);
Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, supra note 17 (addressing value pluralism); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93
(addressing relational feminism); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond “Sellouts” and “Race Cards”: Black Attorneys
and the Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 773 (1997) (addressing critical race theory);
David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV.
1502, 1526 (1998) (addressing critical race theory); see also Pearce & Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal,
supra note 22, at 40–41.
226. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 223, at Ch. 3; MARKOVITS, supra note 222;
Fried, supra note 97; Pepper, supra note 113; Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U.
COL. L. REV. 1 (2003).
227. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 223, at Ch. 3; Pepper, supra note 113.
228. See LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 109; SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 6; WENDEL, supra
note 17; Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, supra note 17.
229. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 159; Simon, Lawyer Advice, supra note 98, at 223.
230. See Shaffer, supra note 17, at 986–87.
231. See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufmann trans. 1970).
232. See, e.g., Thomas Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty, 23 GA. L. REV. 1022 (1989)
(making arguments based on Aristotelian and Christian ethics); ROBERT COCHRAN ET AL., LAWYERS CLIENTS AND
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Similarly, the issue of client autonomy captures both the claim that the
competing conceptions of role are binary and the falseness of that claim. One
narrative of the extreme partisan perspective is that in respecting client autonomy
it replaced or rejected a paternalistic conception found in traditional professionalism and in the diverse perspectives on responsible lawyering.233 With regard to
traditional professionalism, the claim is particularly ironic. The crisis of
professionalism rhetoric complains that lawyers have lost something when their
corporate clients have become more sophisticated and have more leverage in
their relationship with their lawyers234—precisely the client autonomy that the
now dominant rhetoric of extreme partisanship celebrates.235
As William Simon has compellingly explained, “the debate between the
autonomy and paternalist views is so often moot.”236 Acknowledging that the
simplistic versions of paternalism as lawyers imposing their own views and
autonomy as lawyers simply following clients’ directions conflict, Simon
explains that, “once we get beyond the crude versions, it is hard to distinguish the
autonomy and paternalist views.”237 The “refined view [of each] contemplates a
dialogue with the client that it recognizes is both essential to understanding the
client and fraught with dangers of oppressing or misunderstanding him.”238 At
the same time, “[e]ach refined view involves a dialectic of objective constructs
(the ‘typical client’ presumption or the minimal reasonableness test) and efforts
to know the client as a concrete subject.”239 He argues that:
The paternalist view is intensely individualistic to the extent that it aspires to
deep knowledge of the client as a concrete individual and grounds the lawyer’s
decision in the client’s self-realization. Even where it disregards client choices
because they fail the minimum reasonableness test, it is not denying the value
of autonomy, just that the particular client has the capacity for autonomous
choice.240

Similarly, he observes that “the refined autonomy view is quite collectivist to
the extent that it licenses the application of objective ‘typical’ client presumptions
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2009) (arguing based on Aristotelian conception of friendship and Buber’s
understanding of I-Thou relationships).
233. See, e.g., MARKOVITS, supra note 222; FREEDMAN & SMITH, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 223. We want
to distinguish these scholars from those who find lawyer paternalism based in lawyer negligence or placing their
allegiance to fellow lawyers above loyalty to their clients. See e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND
CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR
CLIENTS (1995); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15
(1967).
234. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 55, at 760–61.
235. See MARKOVITS, supra note 222.
236. Simon, Lawyer Advice, supra note 98, at 225.
237. Id. at 224.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 224–25.
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to the particular client.”241
Fortunately, when we move beyond the simplistic and inaccurate domain of
dichotomous conceptions of role, whether autonomy versus paternalism, or
zealous versus responsible lawyering, we enter the relational workplace, where
lawyers of different views would benefit each other through dialogue in the
relational legal profession. Put differently, while any thoughtful conception of the
lawyer’s role entails a dialogue with the client that is both “essential to
understanding the client and fraught with dangers of oppressing or misunderstanding him,” a relational approach suggests a platform on which lawyers can
navigate the fine line between empowering and manipulating clients.
C. JOB SATISFACTION

In the wake of the crisis of professionalism, a division has arisen regarding
whether lawyers are satisfied or unsatisfied with their work. The majority of
commentators observe that some lawyers in private practice are unhappy because
they no longer find meaning in their work.242 As Susan Daicoff has observed,
“‘professionalism’ has declined, public opinion of attorneys and the legal
profession has plummeted, and lawyer dissatisfaction and dysfunction have
increased.”243 Commentators who describe private practice during the crisis of
professionalism as largely unhealthy point to the relative high rates of substance
abuse and mental health problems among lawyers in private practice,244 and one
commentator goes so far as to label big firm practice itself as a source of mental
illness.245 Anecdotes abound of lawyers who say they would not recommend
friends or family to become lawyers, and at least one study found a majority of
lawyers to have this view.246
Based on a recent and large-scale empirical study, Krieger and Sheldon found
that “public service lawyers were happier and more satisfied than other lawyers,
including those in the most prestigious, highly paid positions.”247 In particular,
they observed that “there were no external rewards or status factors that
strongly, or even moderately, predicted attorney well-being . . . . The data
contradict beliefs that prestige, income, and other external benefits can adequately compensate a lawyer who does not regularly experience autonomy,

241. Id. at 225.
242. See Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15, at 592; Schiltz, supra note 49, at 881.
243. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing
on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1997).
244. See Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15, at 586–87 (finding that “[l]awyers in public service positions
also drank less than private attorneys, particularly those in positions that typically provide the most income”);
Schiltz, supra note 49, at 874–77 (describing the high rates of mental illness and alcohol and drug abuse among
lawyers).
245. See Schiltz, supra note 49, at 902–03.
246. GLENDON, supra note 42, at 85; Schiltz, supra note 49, at 881–82.
247. Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15, at 627.
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integrity, close relationships, and interest and meaning in her work.”248
At the other end of the dichotomy are the job satisfaction skeptics. Monroe
Freedman points out one should be careful not to overstate, simplify and
trivialize the extent of lawyers’ unhappiness.249 Similarly, in their Chicago study,
John Heinz, Kathleen E. Hull, and Ava Harter found “generally high levels of
satisfaction reported by all categories of lawyers.”250 Contrary to Krieger and
Sheldon, they found that “[t]he strongest and most consistent effect on lawyers’
overall job satisfaction is produced by . . . lawyers’ income levels”251 at the same
time that they conceded that “[t]he percentage of ‘very satisfied’ respondents is
ten points lower in the large firm category than in any of the other practice
settings.”252
While the dichotomy between the satisfaction and dissatisfaction approaches
appears based in binary conclusions regarding both satisfaction and its primary
cause, both sets of studies find that lawyers are similar to business people in the
relational way they understand and approach their work,253 suggesting that the
business-profession dichotomy does not apply to job satisfaction and that
grounds exist for further dialogue regarding the causes and symptoms of job
satisfaction. Ironically, the dominance of the atomistic self-interest approach has
gotten in the way of serious studies into the extent and causes of lawyers’
dissatisfaction with their work. While some critics have argued that atomism and
the lawyer as a bad man were the causes of unhappiness and others opposed the
charge, both camps failed to realize that the debate over lawyers as hired guns
simply distracted from studying the actual causes of and extent of lawyers’
dissatisfaction and led to artificially binary perspectives that made dialogue
problematic.
D. SEGMENTATION OR SHARED VALUES?

Admittedly, law work is segmented. Heinz and Lauman, for example, coined
the famous metaphor of two hemispheres to divide lawyers who represented
corporations from those who represented individuals,254 and subsequently many
have documented the increased specialization and segmentation of law prac-

248. Id. at 623–24.
249. See Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Misunderstanding Lawyers’ Ethics, 108 MICH. L. REV. 925
(2010) (reviewing DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ETHICS IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE
(2011)).
250. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74
IND. L.J. 735, 757 (1999).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 745.
253. See id. at 757; Krieger & Sheldon, supra note 15, at 621.
254. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319
(1982).
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tice.255 Today, new forces contribute to the increased fragmentation of law
practice, with non-lawyer businesses providing significant amounts of legal
work. Legal Zoom, for example, accounts for approximately twenty percent of
incorporations in California.256 As a result, questions arise as to whether core
shared values continue to unite all lawyers as opposed to non-lawyers, and,
relatedly, whether regulation of lawyers and of legal services (including those
offered by non-lawyers) should be universal or segmented.
To date, the bar regulates lawyers, and non-lawyer providers are unregulated.
This is a segmented approach that both creates and reaffirms a dichotomy
between legal workers who are lawyers and those who are not.257 As non-lawyer
software accounts for an increasing percentage of the market for legal services,
this dichotomy is starting to fade. The bar has approved experiments in
non-lawyer practice, such as that in Washington State,258 and the ABA is
considering regulating legal services, alongside lawyers, similar to the way
England and Wales currently regulate legal services.259 Indeed, just as England
and Wales have established regulatory objectives for legal services, the ABA is
considering a similar step. Dana Remus has identified an alternative to the
dichotomy—regulating legal services to ensure the “relational dynamics” of
“trust, judgment, loyalty, empowerment, and service.”260
Interestingly, at the same time that the trend is moving toward extending
universal regulation from lawyers to legal services, some seek to replace
universal regulation of lawyers with contextual rules or specialized codes of
conduct.261 Although the ABA has historically taken a universal approach to
regulating lawyers,262 some scholars have argued for contextual regulation.263
Levin and Mather, for example, have argued that “[t]he one-size-fits-all approach
255. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005).
256. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL, supra note 208, at 93.
257. See id.
258. See Remus, supra note 17, at 8; WSBA, supra note 219.
259. See Model Regulatory Objectives, supra note 221; Webb, supra note 173, at 543–47 (describing the
United Kingdom’s Legal Services Act of 2007); William C. Hubbard, A Year of Progress, 101 A.B.A. J. 8, 8
(2015) (describing the ABA’s Commission on the Future of Legal Services).
260. Remus, supra note 17, at 24.
261. A similar debate is emerging with regard to law schools with Randy Jonakait and Brian Tamanaha
arguing for different training for elite and non-elite law schools, and with other scholars, including Elizabeth
Chambliss and Rebecca Roiphe, defending the universal approach. Compare BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW
SCHOOLS 167–85 (2012) and Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Education and the Rise and
Fall of Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 862, 902–03 (2006/2007) with Elizabeth Chambliss, It’s Not
About Us: Beyond the Job Market Critique of U.S. Law Schools, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2013) and
Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, supra note 3, at 198, 241; Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism:
Julius Henry Cohen and the Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 72–74 (2012).
262. See Wald, Resizing, supra note 99, at 228.
263. See, e.g., Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note
99, at 3–17; Alexander A. Guerrero, Lawyers, Context, and Legitimacy: A New Theory of Legal Ethics, 25 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 107 (2012); David B. Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the
Role of Context in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note 99, at 25–42.
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of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . needs to be revised.”264 As
with regard to extending regulation from lawyers to legal services, Dana Remus
has in contrast identified universal values of “trust, judgment, loyalty, empowerment, and service” that would apply to all legal services providers.265 Eli Wald
has offered a way to collapse the dichotomy between universal and context
through “univertext” rules that would integrate universal values and the empirical
lessons from lawyering contexts.266
As the profession struggles to come to terms with the increased specialization
of its members which questions the existence of core values all are beholden to,
increased stratification and increased competition from non-lawyers, a relational
approach offers a solid foundation on which to build future regulation of lawyers
and non-lawyers who offer legal services alike. On the one hand, a relational
approach unites all lawyers around the core values of trust, judgment, loyalty,
empowerment, and service to clients, as well as renewed commitment to the
public good, establishing the very foundation for promulgating univertext rules
that would integrate these universal values and the empirical lessons from
lawyers’ varying specialized contexts. On the other hand, a relational perspective
creates a space in which lawyers can connect with non-lawyers, opening the door
to regulation of all legal service provides.

CONCLUSION
Law work is great work. The time is right to move beyond the rhetoric
lamenting the state of the legal profession and of legal work generally. Building
on exciting trends both inside the legal profession and society as a whole, we can
recover the joy and reward of law work, and can recognize that being good
lawyers and making a good livelihood are perfectly reconcilable.
Indeed, lawyers as civics teachers are uniquely situated to help society
overcome the atomistic self-interest perspective that has dominated American
culture, politics, ideology and values for the past generation. Although atomistic
self-interest has also governed law and lawyers’ professional ideology, role
morality, and practice, precluding members of the bar from acting as leaders in
the public interest promoting the public good alongside the private interests of
their clients, the tide is shifting. Private and public interests have in the past and
will in the future co-exist, and the public interest can once again mean more than
an aggregate of private interests. Relational self-interest provides the conceptual
basis on which lawyers and others can build to develop this lost vision of the
public good.

264. LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note 99, at 370.
265. Remus, supra note 17, at 24.
266. Wald, Resizing, supra note 99, at 256–57.
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The shift to a practice of law, professional ideology, role morality, rules of
professional conduct, and civic leadership based on an ethic of relational
self-interest outlined in this article is only a beginning. The most important
change is one of direction. Once lawyers take the lead in helping society and
helping themselves reintegrate ethics into law and economics, the legal profession can fulfill the charge it received from Justice Louis Brandeis during national
turmoil at the start of the Twentieth Century. As Brandeis noted in words that are
equally true today, “[t]here is a call upon the legal profession to do a great work
for this country.”267

267. Brandeis, supra note 33, at 563.

